HCONRES-101-119
Referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
Sponsored by Sara Jacobs (D-CA)
What it does
This concurrent resolution would direct the President, under Section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, to remove U.S. Armed Forces from hostilities against Iran or its government and military unless Congress explicitly authorizes the use of force through a declaration of war or a specific Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF). It would not prevent the U.S. from defending itself, its forces, diplomatic facilities, or allies from imminent attack, nor would it require removal of U.S. troops in the region who are not engaged in hostilities against Iran. It also would not affect U.S. intelligence collection, analysis, or sharing related to Iran.
Who benefits
U.S. military service members currently engaged in or at risk of hostilities with Iran, who would be withdrawn from combat. Taxpayers who would no longer bear the costs of ongoing military operations against Iran. Iranian civilians who could face reduced risk of harm from U.S. military action. Diplomatic and foreign policy actors who favor negotiated solutions. Members of Congress who argue their war-declaration authority has been bypassed. Regional allies who may prefer a de-escalatory posture.
Who is hurt
U.S. allies — particularly Israel and Gulf states — who may rely on active U.S. military pressure on Iran as a deterrent. Defense contractors and industries supporting ongoing military operations who could see reduced demand. Intelligence and military planners who argue active military posture strengthens leverage in negotiations. U.S. diplomatic personnel whose security posture could be affected if deterrence is perceived to weaken. Iranians and regional populations who supporters of the current posture argue are protected by U.S. military pressure on the Iranian government.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that the Constitution vests the power to declare war exclusively in Congress under Article I, Section 8, and that any sustained military hostilities against Iran without a formal declaration or AUMF violates that framework. They contend the War Powers Resolution was enacted precisely to prevent open-ended presidential military action, and that invoking Section 5(c) is the mechanism Congress designed for this situation. They further argue the resolution preserves all defensive capabilities and intelligence activities, making it a targeted check on offensive operations rather than a blanket withdrawal.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that the President's Commander-in-Chief authority under Article II, Section 2 grants broad discretion to conduct military operations, particularly in response to ongoing threats, and that a concurrent resolution — which does not require the President's signature — is constitutionally insufficient to compel troop withdrawal. They contend that abruptly ending military hostilities could embolden Iran, undermine regional deterrence, and endanger U.S. allies and forces already in the theater. They further argue the resolution's carve-outs for defensive action and intelligence are too narrow to account for the fluid, fast-moving nature of modern conflict with Iran.
Constitutional context
The Declare War Clause (Art. I, §8, cl. 11) gives Congress the power to declare war, while the Commander-in-Chief Clause (Art. II, §2, cl. 1) gives the President broad authority to direct military operations. The War Powers Resolution (1973) attempts to bridge this tension by requiring congressional authorization for sustained hostilities, but the constitutionality of using a concurrent resolution — which bypasses the President's veto — to compel troop withdrawal has never been definitively resolved by the Supreme Court.
Checks and balances
Congress would gain authority to compel an end to offensive military operations against Iran; however, the President retains a potential constitutional challenge to the concurrent resolution mechanism, as it does not require presidential signature and its enforceability remains legally contested.
Historical precedent
Congress has previously invoked the War Powers Resolution via concurrent resolution, most notably in 2019–2020 resolutions directing the removal of U.S. forces from the Yemen conflict, which passed both chambers but faced presidential veto and constitutional enforceability questions.