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189 Yea235 Nay7 Not voting1/2 required
HCONRES-108-119
POSTPONED PROCEEDINGS - At the conclusion of debate on H.Con.Res. 108, the Chair put the question on agreeing to the resolution and by voice vote, announced the noes had prevailed. Mr. Meek demanded the yeas and nays and the Chair postponed further proceedings until a time to be announced.
Sponsored by Rashida Tlaib (D-MI)
What it does
This concurrent resolution would invoke Section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution to direct the President to remove U.S. Armed Forces from hostilities in Lebanon. As a concurrent resolution, it would not require the President's signature to pass Congress, but it also carries no binding force of law on its own. It would express Congress's formal directive that U.S. military involvement in Lebanon cease.
Who benefits
U.S. military service members currently deployed in or near Lebanon who would be withdrawn from active hostilities. Members of Congress who argue the executive branch has exceeded its war-making authority without a formal declaration or authorization. Advocacy groups and constituents opposed to U.S. military engagement in Lebanon. Lebanese civilians if reduced U.S. military activity lowers the risk of escalation in the region.
Who is hurt
U.S. allies in the region — particularly Israel — who may rely on U.S. military presence or support as a deterrent or operational partner. U.S. diplomatic and strategic interests that depend on a credible military posture in the Middle East. Lebanese factions or groups that may benefit from U.S. military presence as a stabilizing force. Defense contractors and personnel supporting current operations who would see reduced activity.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that the Constitution vests the power to declare war exclusively in Congress under Article I, Section 8, and that any sustained U.S. military engagement in Lebanon without congressional authorization violates that framework. They contend the War Powers Resolution was enacted precisely to prevent open-ended executive military commitments, and that invoking Section 5(c) is the proper constitutional mechanism for Congress to reassert its role — consistent with the resolution's original intent after the Vietnam-era experience of undeclared wars.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that a concurrent resolution lacks the force of law under INS v. Chadha (1983), which held that Congress cannot exercise legislative power through a resolution that bypasses the President's veto — meaning this measure may be constitutionally ineffective as a binding directive. They further contend that the President's Commander-in-Chief authority under Article II, Section 2 grants broad discretion to conduct military operations, and that withdrawing forces on a congressional timeline could undermine operational security, destabilize the region, and damage U.S. credibility with allies.
Constitutional context
The War Powers Resolution's Section 5(c) concurrent resolution mechanism is directly at issue. The Declare War Clause (Art. I, §8, cl. 11) and the Commander-in-Chief Clause (Art. II, §2, cl. 1) create the core tension here. After INS v. Chadha (1983), the legal enforceability of a concurrent resolution as a binding directive on the President has been seriously questioned, though the War Powers Resolution itself has never been definitively ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.
Checks and balances
Congress would gain a formal mechanism to direct military withdrawal, but the President retains Commander-in-Chief authority and could contest the resolution's legal enforceability; courts have historically declined to resolve War Powers disputes as political questions, leaving the check largely political rather than judicial.
Historical precedent
Congress has previously passed War Powers concurrent resolutions directing troop withdrawals — most notably regarding U.S. forces in Yemen (2019), which passed both chambers but was vetoed by President Trump, illustrating the practical limits of the mechanism.
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