Failed
212 Yea212 Nay6 Not voting1/2 required
HCONRES-75-119
Motion to reconsider laid on the table Agreed to without objection.
Sponsored by Josh Gottheimer (D-NJ)
What it does
This concurrent resolution would invoke Section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution to direct the President to remove U.S. Armed Forces from hostilities against Iran. As a concurrent resolution, it would not require the President's signature to pass Congress, but it also carries no binding force of law under current legal interpretation. It would serve as a formal congressional directive expressing the will of both chambers that military engagement with Iran cease.
Who benefits
U.S. military personnel currently engaged in or at risk of hostilities with Iran, who would be withdrawn from those operations. Members of Congress who argue their war-declaration authority has been bypassed. Diplomatic and foreign policy actors who favor a negotiated approach to Iran. American civilians and businesses in the region who face risk from escalating conflict. Iranian civilians who could face reduced risk of U.S. military action.
Who is hurt
U.S. allies in the region — particularly Israel and Gulf states — who may rely on U.S. military pressure on Iran as a deterrent. Defense contractors and industries supporting active military operations that would be scaled back. Intelligence and military officials who argue ongoing operations are necessary for national security. Advocates for a harder line on Iran's nuclear program, who may see withdrawal as reducing U.S. leverage.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that the Constitution vests the power to declare war exclusively in Congress under Article I, Section 8, and that any sustained military hostilities against Iran without a formal declaration or specific congressional authorization violates that framework. They contend the War Powers Resolution exists precisely for this situation — to reassert congressional authority when the executive branch commits forces to hostilities without approval — and that a concurrent resolution is the mechanism Congress designed to compel withdrawal within 60 days of unauthorized engagement.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that the President's Commander-in-Chief authority under Article II, Section 2 grants broad discretion to conduct military operations, and that existing authorizations — including prior AUMFs and emergency powers — may already provide sufficient legal basis for operations against Iran. They further contend that a concurrent resolution carries no binding legal force after INS v. Chadha (1983), which held that legislative vetoes not presented to the President are unconstitutional, meaning the resolution may be a symbolic gesture that does not legally compel the executive to act.
Constitutional context
The Declare War Clause (Art. I, §8, cl. 11) gives Congress the power to declare war, while the Commander-in-Chief Clause (Art. II, §2, cl. 1) gives the President broad authority over military operations. The War Powers Resolution's concurrent resolution mechanism has never been definitively upheld by the Supreme Court, and INS v. Chadha (1983) — though not directly on point — raised serious questions about whether legislative actions not presented to the President can have binding legal effect on executive conduct.
Checks and balances
Congress would gain a formal vehicle to assert its war powers authority, but the executive branch retains practical control over military operations and may contest the resolution's legal enforceability; courts have historically declined to resolve war powers disputes as political questions.
Historical precedent
Congress has previously invoked the War Powers Resolution via concurrent resolution — most notably in 2019 and 2020 regarding U.S. involvement in Yemen and the authority to use force against Iran — with similar resolutions passing one or both chambers but facing presidential veto threats or questions about enforceability.
Failed