Failed
92 Yea324 Nay14 Not voting1/2 required
HCONRES-84-119
Motion to reconsider laid on the table Agreed to without objection.
Sponsored by Rashida Tlaib (D-MI)
What it does
This concurrent resolution would direct the President, under section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, to remove United States Armed Forces from Lebanon no later than 7 days after the resolution's adoption. It would require both the House and Senate to agree, but does not require the President's signature.
Who benefits
U.S. service members stationed in Lebanon and their families, who proponents argue would face reduced risk of being drawn into regional conflict. Members of Congress seeking to reassert legislative authority over military deployments. Advocates for reduced U.S. military involvement in the Middle East.
Who is hurt
U.S. military and diplomatic personnel whose missions in Lebanon (such as security cooperation, embassy protection, or evacuation planning) would be curtailed. Lebanese partners or allied forces relying on U.S. military presence or support. The President and Department of Defense, whose operational flexibility in the region would be constrained. U.S. citizens in Lebanon who might rely on a nearby military presence for potential evacuation assistance.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that under the Constitution's Declare War Clause, Congress—not the President alone—holds authority over sustained military engagements, and that any U.S. forces in Lebanon risk being drawn into a widening regional conflict without specific congressional authorization. They contend the War Powers Resolution's section 5(c) mechanism exists precisely for situations like this, giving Congress a concurrent-resolution tool to force withdrawal when it judges continued deployment unauthorized or unwise.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that a 7-day withdrawal timeline is dangerously rigid and could endanger U.S. personnel, disrupt ongoing security or evacuation operations, and signal reduced U.S. commitment to regional partners at a volatile moment. They contend the President, as Commander-in-Chief, needs operational flexibility to protect American citizens and interests abroad, and that Congress imposing a fixed deadline without consulting military commanders risks a hasty, poorly coordinated drawdown.
Constitutional context
This resolution invokes the War Powers Resolution's section 5(c) mechanism, which sits at the intersection of Congress's Declare War Clause authority (Art. I, §8, cl. 11) and the President's Commander-in-Chief power (Art. II, §2, cl. 1); no court has definitively ruled on whether such concurrent resolutions can bind the President without his signature, since INS v. Chadha (1983) cast doubt on legislative vetoes lacking presentment.
Checks and balances
Congress would assert authority to direct troop withdrawal without presidential signoff, but the mechanism's enforceability is constitutionally uncertain since a concurrent resolution bypasses presentment to the President, a process INS v. Chadha suggests may be required for measures with legal force.
Historical precedent
Congress has previously invoked War Powers Resolution section 5(c) or similar mechanisms in resolutions concerning Somalia, Libya, and Yemen, though presidents have often disputed their binding legal effect.
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