HJRES-122-118
Placed on the Union Calendar, Calendar No. 516.
Sponsored by Andy Barr (R-KY)
What it does
This joint resolution would use the Congressional Review Act (CRA) to nullify a Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) rule published March 15, 2024. That rule lowered the maximum late fee that large credit card issuers could charge under a "safe harbor" provision from roughly $30 to $8, and removed automatic annual inflation adjustments to that cap. If this resolution passes, the CFPB rule would have no legal force and the previous, higher fee cap would remain in effect.
Who benefits
Large credit card issuers (those with more than one million open accounts), who would retain the ability to charge late fees above $8 under the existing safe-harbor framework. Shareholders and investors in large financial institutions would also benefit from preserved fee revenue. Cardholders who consistently pay on time may indirectly benefit if issuers do not shift costs to them through higher interest rates or annual fees.
Who is hurt
Cardholders at large issuers who pay late would continue to face late fees that can reach approximately $30 or more, rather than the $8 cap the CFPB rule would have established. Lower-income cardholders, who research suggests are more likely to incur late fees, would be disproportionately affected. Consumer advocacy organizations that supported the CFPB rule would see a policy priority reversed.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that the CFPB exceeded its statutory authority by setting an $8 cap that bears no reasonable relationship to the actual costs issuers incur when processing a late payment, effectively turning the safe-harbor provision into a price control. They contend that artificially suppressing late fees would cause issuers to recover lost revenue through higher interest rates, reduced credit access, or new fees — ultimately harming the broad population of cardholders, including those who pay on time. Supporters also argue that Congress, not an unelected agency, should make decisions of this economic magnitude, consistent with the Supreme Court's major questions doctrine established in West Virginia v. EPA (2022) and the end of Chevron deference under Loper Bright v. Raimondo (2024). They maintain that the CRA is the appropriate democratic check on agency rulemaking that overreaches its mandate.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that the CFPB acted squarely within its authority under the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) Act, which directs the bureau to ensure penalty fees are "reasonable and proportional" to the violation — and that the $8 figure reflects the bureau's data-driven finding that current fees far exceed issuers' actual costs. They contend that nullifying the rule would preserve what they characterize as excess fee revenue estimated at billions of dollars annually, paid disproportionately by lower-income consumers who are least able to absorb the cost. Opponents also argue that using the CRA to block the rule sets a precedent of congressional interference with evidence-based consumer protection rulemaking, weakening the CFPB's ability to fulfill its statutory mission. They maintain that market competition has not been sufficient to discipline late fee levels, which is precisely why Congress created the CFPB and granted it this authority.
Constitutional context
The primary constitutional and legal framework involves the scope of agency authority under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause, which grant Congress — and by delegation, agencies — broad power to regulate interstate financial markets. However, recent doctrinal shifts are directly relevant: West Virginia v. EPA (2022) established the major questions doctrine, requiring agencies to show clear congressional authorization for rules of vast economic significance. Loper Bright v. Raimondo (2024) eliminated Chevron deference, meaning courts will independently interpret whether the CARD Act authorizes an $8 cap rather than deferring to the CFPB's reading. The Congressional Review Act itself is a structural mechanism through which Congress exercises oversight of executive agency rulemaking, consistent with the non-delegation principle that Congress retains ultimate legislative authority.
Checks and balances
This resolution would shift authority from the executive branch (specifically the CFPB, an independent agency within the executive branch) back to Congress. Under the CRA, a successful disapproval resolution also bars the agency from issuing a "substantially similar" rule in the future without new congressional authorization, representing a durable constraint on agency power. The President retains a veto, meaning the resolution requires either presidential signature or a veto override to take effect.
Historical precedent
Congress has used the Congressional Review Act to nullify agency rules on multiple occasions. The most prominent period was 2017, when Congress passed 16 CRA resolutions to nullify rules finalized in the final months of the Obama administration. A prior CRA attempt to nullify a CFPB rule — the 2017 arbitration rule — was signed into law, establishing direct precedent for using the CRA against CFPB rulemaking specifically.