HJRES-147-119
Referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
Sponsored by Gregory Meeks (D-NY)
What it does
This bill would terminate a national emergency declaration that the executive branch used as legal authority to impose tariffs (import duties) on goods coming from Brazil. Under the National Emergencies Act, Congress has the power to pass a joint resolution to end a presidentially declared national emergency. If enacted, this resolution would remove the emergency declaration and, with it, the legal basis for the Brazil-specific tariffs.
Who benefits
U.S. businesses that import goods from Brazil — including manufacturers that rely on Brazilian steel, aluminum, agricultural products, or other raw materials — would likely see lower input costs. U.S. consumers who buy products made with Brazilian imports could see modest price reductions. Brazilian exporters and the Brazilian economy broadly would benefit from restored market access. U.S. industries that compete with Brazilian imports could face increased competition, though they may also benefit if they use Brazilian inputs in their own supply chains.
Who is hurt
U.S. domestic industries that compete directly with Brazilian imports — such as steel, aluminum, or agricultural producers — could face greater foreign competition if tariffs are removed. Workers in those industries may face wage or employment pressure. U.S. trade negotiators could lose a tool used as leverage in bilateral negotiations with Brazil. Communities economically dependent on protected domestic industries may experience indirect economic effects.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that using a national emergency declaration to impose tariffs on a stable trading partner like Brazil stretches emergency powers beyond their intended purpose and bypasses Congress's constitutional authority over foreign commerce. They contend that tariffs on Brazilian goods raise costs for U.S. manufacturers and consumers without a clear national security justification, and that Congress has both the right and the responsibility under the National Emergencies Act to terminate emergency declarations it views as unwarranted.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that the tariffs on Brazilian imports serve as legitimate economic leverage to address trade imbalances, unfair subsidies, or market access barriers, and that terminating the emergency prematurely removes a key negotiating tool before those goals are achieved. They contend that the President, as Commander-in-Chief and chief diplomat, is better positioned than Congress to time the removal of trade pressure, and that unilaterally ending the emergency could signal weakness in ongoing bilateral trade discussions with Brazil.
Constitutional context
Congress's authority over tariffs and foreign commerce is grounded in the Foreign Commerce Clause (Art. I, §8, cl. 3), but Congress has delegated broad emergency economic powers to the President — powers whose limits are actively debated. The National Emergencies Act provides Congress a statutory mechanism to terminate declared emergencies by joint resolution, which is the mechanism this bill uses. The separation of powers between Congress's commerce authority and the President's foreign affairs and Commander-in-Chief powers is the central constitutional backdrop here.
Checks and balances
Congress would reclaim authority over the tariff regime by terminating the executive's emergency declaration; the President retains a veto over this joint resolution, and Congress would need a two-thirds majority in both chambers to override that veto.
Historical precedent
Congress has passed similar joint resolutions to terminate national emergencies used to impose tariffs, including resolutions targeting tariffs on Canadian and Mexican goods under the same emergency authority during the 119th Congress, though those resolutions faced presidential vetoes.