HR-10163-119
Ordered to be Reported (Amended) by the Yeas and Nays: 36 - 0.
Sponsored by Nicholas Langworthy (R-NY)
What it does
This bill would direct the Secretary of Commerce to act as the President's principal advisor on quantum technology policy and to promote "trusted" supply chains for quantum technology components, defined to include the U.S., allied nations, and companies based in those countries. It would authorize the Secretary to enter agreements with trusted suppliers, foreign partners, other agencies, and states, identify supply chain vulnerabilities tied to "covered nations" (such as China), and require a public strategy report to Congress every three years. The bill explicitly does not require private companies to share information or comply with any recommendations.
Who benefits
U.S. quantum technology companies and manufacturers, who may gain federal support, agreements, and investment promotion; companies in allied nations (EU, NATO, OECD members) that qualify as "trusted suppliers"; the Commerce Department, which gains new coordinating authority; and national security-focused policymakers seeking to reduce reliance on countries like China for quantum components.
Who is hurt
Suppliers and manufacturers based in "covered nations" (such as China) who would be excluded from "trusted supply chain" designation and related federal support; companies outside the trusted-partner countries that may face reduced access to U.S. quantum supply chain agreements; and potentially U.S. companies that currently source cheaper quantum components from non-trusted countries and may need to find alternative suppliers.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that quantum technology is a strategically critical emerging field where U.S. commercial leadership and supply chain security are essential to national competitiveness, particularly given China's significant investment in quantum research. They contend that designating trusted suppliers and requiring a coordinated Commerce Department strategy would reduce dependence on adversarial nations for critical components, mirroring successful approaches used for semiconductors under the CHIPS Act.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that the bill grants the Secretary broad, loosely defined discretion to determine what counts as a "critical component" or appropriate action, with few substantive limits or oversight mechanisms specified in the text. They contend that voluntary compliance provisions and the lack of enforcement authority may render the program largely symbolic while still creating administrative costs and potential favoritism toward politically connected firms designated as "trusted suppliers."
Constitutional context
Congress's authority to direct executive branch trade and industrial policy derives from the Commerce Clause (Art. I, §8, cl. 3), and the bill raises no significant constitutional dispute since it creates only advisory and coordinating functions without compelling private compliance or regulating speech or search authority.
Checks and balances
The executive branch (Secretary of Commerce) gains new advisory and coordinating authority over quantum technology policy, but Congress retains oversight through the mandated triennial public reporting requirement and appropriations control, and the bill explicitly limits the Secretary's power by exempting private companies from mandatory disclosure or compliance.
Historical precedent
The CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 established a similar model of federal promotion of trusted domestic and allied supply chains for semiconductors, though that law included substantial direct funding while this bill does not.