HR-10184-119
Referred to the Committee on Financial Services, and in addition to the Committees on the Judiciary, Small Business, and Oversight and Government Reform, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
Sponsored by Andy Barr (R-KY)
What it does
This bill would move the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) from independent Federal Reserve funding into the annual congressional appropriations process, create a Senate-confirmed inspector general for the agency, and require extensive cost-benefit analyses and periodic OMB review of its rules. It would also narrow the Bureau's authority to define and pursue "abusive," "unfair," or "deceptive" practices, add notice-and-cure and statute-of-limitations protections for regulated firms, limit CFPB authority over insurance-regulated entities and attorneys' litigation conduct, create a safe harbor for small-dollar credit products, and raise the asset thresholds triggering CFPB supervision of banks and credit unions.
Who benefits
Banks, credit unions, small-dollar lenders, debt-collection law firms, and other financial firms regulated by the CFPB, who would face narrower enforcement standards, longer cure periods, and reduced supervisory reach; state insurance regulators and state attorneys general operating in overlapping jurisdiction; and small businesses subject to CFPB rulemaking, who would gain new regulatory flexibility protections.
Who is hurt
Consumers who file complaints or are harmed by disputed lending, debt-collection, or disclosure practices, who could see narrower "abusive act" definitions and added procedural hurdles before enforcement; consumer advocacy groups and state regulators whose parallel authority could be constrained in overlapping cases; and the CFPB itself, which would lose independent funding and face additional review layers from OMB, potentially slowing its rulemaking and enforcement timelines.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue the CFPB has operated with insufficient political accountability since its funding comes from the Federal Reserve rather than Congress, and that vague "abusive practices" authority has let the agency regulate through unpredictable enforcement rather than clear rules, citing years of industry complaints about ambiguous standards. They contend subjecting the Bureau to appropriations, OMB cost-benefit review, and clearer statutory definitions would increase transparency and predictability for both regulated firms and consumers without eliminating consumer protections.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that subjecting the CFPB to annual appropriations would let a future Congress or administration effectively defund consumer protection enforcement, replicating the political interference the agency's original design was meant to prevent after the 2008 financial crisis. They contend the narrowed "abusive practices" definition, notice-and-cure requirements, and OMB review layered on top of independent judicial review would collectively slow enforcement and let harmful practices continue longer before consumers see relief.
Constitutional context
The bill implicates Congress's Article I appropriations and Necessary and Proper Clause authority to structure agency funding and rulemaking, and its provision requiring OMB review of CFPB rules raises separation-of-powers questions similar to those the Supreme Court weighed in Seila Law v. CFPB (2020), which found the Bureau's single-director removal structure unconstitutional but left its funding structure intact until later addressed in CFSA v. CFPB (2024), which upheld the Bureau's Federal Reserve funding mechanism as consistent with the Appropriations Clause.
Checks and balances
Congress would gain direct budgetary control over the CFPB through annual appropriations, and the executive branch (via OMB) would gain a new review role over CFPB rules, both of which would reduce the Bureau's current independence from political branches while remaining subject to judicial review of agency rulemaking.
Historical precedent
Congress has previously debated but not enacted similar CFPB funding and structural reform bills in prior sessions following Seila Law v. CFPB (2020) and CFSA v. CFPB (2024), which upheld the Bureau's existing funding structure against a similar Appropriations Clause challenge.