HR-10335-119
Referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary.
Sponsored by Glenn Grothman (R-WI)
What it does
This bill would amend the federal civil rights attorney's fees statute (42 U.S.C. 1988) to define "prevailing party" more broadly. It would allow plaintiffs to recover attorney's fees not only when they win a final court judgment, but also when they win a preliminary injunction that is not reversed, sign an enforceable settlement or consent decree, or when the defendant voluntarily changes its conduct in a way that moots the case or grants the relief sought. The change would apply to cases already pending as well as new cases filed after enactment.
Who benefits
Civil rights plaintiffs and their attorneys, particularly those who win preliminary relief or cause a defendant to change conduct before final judgment; public interest law firms and legal aid organizations that rely on fee-shifting to fund civil rights litigation; individuals and groups challenging government policies who often obtain relief through early injunctions or voluntary policy changes rather than final rulings.
Who is hurt
Government defendants (federal, state, and local agencies) and private defendants in civil rights suits, who would face attorney's fee liability more often, including in cases they never fully litigated to judgment; taxpayers who fund government defense and fee payments; defendants who might have preferred to voluntarily moot a claim without paying fees, which could discourage early voluntary compliance in some cases.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue this bill restores the pre-2001 understanding of "prevailing party" that existed before Buckhannon Board v. West Virginia Dept. of Health (2001) narrowed fee eligibility to require a judicially sanctioned change, which they contend allowed defendants to strategically moot cases by voluntarily changing policy only after a lawsuit forced their hand, thereby avoiding fees and discouraging civil rights litigation. They contend that without this fix, defendants have an incentive to delay compliance until the last possible moment, knowing that a late voluntary change can strip plaintiffs of any fee recovery even after years of costly litigation.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue this bill would expose government agencies and private defendants to fee liability even when they voluntarily and promptly correct a problem without any court ruling on the merits, which they contend removes the incentive to settle disputes quickly and cooperatively. They contend that tying fee awards to preliminary injunctions that are later vacated on mootness grounds, or to unilateral policy changes, could produce awards in cases where no court ever determined the plaintiff was legally right, increasing costs for taxpayers and businesses and encouraging more litigation.
Constitutional context
This bill exercises Congress's Article I power to define federal court procedure and remedies rather than raising a distinct constitutional rights question; it responds to the Supreme Court's statutory interpretation in Buckhannon Board & Care Home v. West Virginia Dept. of Health & Human Resources (2001), which held that a "prevailing party" under fee-shifting statutes must obtain a judicially sanctioned change in the parties' relationship.
Checks and balances
Congress would expand statutory fee-shifting rules governing federal courts, and courts retain authority to interpret and apply the new standard case by case, including determining whether a defendant's voluntary change genuinely "substantially" granted the relief sought.
Historical precedent
Congress has previously amended 42 U.S.C. 1988's fee provisions, and this bill is a direct legislative response to the Supreme Court's 2001 Buckhannon decision, which several bills in prior Congresses have also attempted to override.