HR-10695-119
Referred to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce.
Sponsored by August Pfluger (R-TX)
What it does
The bill would require the interagency committee known as Team Telecom, working with NTIA, to draft a Submarine Cable Security Policy within 180 days. The FCC would then have to adopt standard and enhanced security measures as license conditions for landing or operating submarine cables. It would move cable licensing authority in the 1921 Cable Landing License Act from the President to the FCC. It would set deadlines (20 days to accept a filing, 45 days to decide, up to 1 year if referred to the committee) and deem an application approved if the FCC misses its deadline. It would limit when the FCC may refer applications to the committee or add conditions beyond the adopted measures, and would let some applicants self-certify. Other limits apply.
Who benefits
Submarine cable owners and operators, including telecom carriers and large technology companies that finance cables, would get predictable timelines, deemed approval, self-certification options, and the option to land cables early. Existing licensees bound by committee agreements could petition to switch to the standard or enhanced measures. The FCC would gain clearer, centralized authority. Consumers and businesses that rely on international data capacity might see faster cable deployment.
Who is hurt
Team Telecom agencies (DOJ, DHS, Defense) would lose the ability to impose case-by-case security agreements and would get fewer referrals, which could reduce their review of national security risks. Deemed approval after a missed deadline could allow licensing without full review. The FCC would take on tight deadlines and added rulemaking work, which may strain its staff and budget. Cable-adjacent communities and security-focused stakeholders could see less tailored scrutiny of foreign-linked cables. Applicants with complex foreign ownership could face uncertainty over what counts as an enhanced-measures case.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that the current licensing process is slow and relies on case-by-case security agreements, which delays cable projects that carry most international data traffic. They contend that uniform, published security standards, firm deadlines, and a retained committee role for foreign-adversary cases would speed deployment while keeping security protections. They point to the bill's bipartisan sponsorship and its requirement that the FCC enforce the measures under the Communications Act.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that deemed approval when deadlines pass could let cables be licensed without a completed security review, and that limiting committee agreements and referrals could weaken scrutiny of foreign-linked infrastructure. They contend that standardized measures may not fit varied threats, and that the FCC, a communications regulator, lacks the national security expertise of the defense and intelligence agencies. They point to the bill's limits on adding conditions unless the FCC finds a gap.
Constitutional context
Congress regulates foreign and interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause (Art. I, §8, cl. 3) and may reassign authority the 1921 Act gave the President to an independent agency. After Loper Bright v. Raimondo (2024), courts would independently interpret the FCC's rules implementing these provisions. No landmark case squarely governs this licensing structure.
Checks and balances
Authority would shift from the President to the FCC, an independent agency, and the executive-branch committee's leverage would be narrowed; Congress sets deadlines and standards, and courts review FCC rules.
Historical precedent
The FCC's 2024-2025 submarine cable rulemakings and the 2020 Team Telecom executive order (EO 13913) addressed related licensing review, but no prior statute directly set these deadlines and deemed-approval rules.