HR-1353-119
Referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary.
Sponsored by Thomas Tiffany (R-WI)
What it does
This bill would add a new section to federal criminal law (18 U.S.C. Chapter 51) stating that a federal homicide prosecution may proceed regardless of how much time passed between the act or omission that caused a victim's death and the death itself. Under current federal common law, many jurisdictions apply a "year-and-a-day rule" — a historical doctrine that bars homicide charges if the victim dies more than a year and a day after the harmful act. This bill would explicitly eliminate that time limit for all federal homicide offenses.
Who benefits
Families of homicide victims who died long after the initial harmful act (e.g., from prolonged injuries, poisoning, or delayed medical complications). Federal prosecutors who would gain the ability to bring homicide charges in cases where death was delayed. Victims of crimes involving slow-acting causes of death, such as toxic exposure or severe assault. Law enforcement agencies investigating cold cases where a victim lingered before dying.
Who is hurt
Defendants who, under the current year-and-a-day rule, could only be charged with assault or a lesser offense if the victim survived beyond the traditional time limit — they would now face potential homicide charges. Defense attorneys who rely on the time-limit doctrine as a procedural protection. Individuals already convicted of lesser offenses for acts that later resulted in a victim's death could potentially face new federal prosecution, raising double jeopardy concerns in some circumstances.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that the year-and-a-day rule is a relic of medieval English common law, developed when medicine could not reliably establish causation over long periods — a limitation that modern forensic science has largely eliminated. They contend that allowing a perpetrator to escape a homicide charge simply because a victim survived longer than a year and a day produces unjust outcomes, particularly in cases involving poisoning, traumatic brain injury, or other slow-acting harms where causation is now provable. Bipartisan sponsorship of the bill reflects broad agreement that the law should reflect current medical and forensic capabilities.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that eliminating the time limit without replacing it with any alternative standard creates serious due process concerns: the longer the gap between act and death, the harder it becomes for a defendant to mount a meaningful defense, as witnesses disappear, memories fade, and evidence degrades. They contend that the year-and-a-day rule, while old, serves a legitimate function by ensuring that causation can be established with reasonable certainty — and that removing it without requiring prosecutors to meet a heightened causation standard could expose defendants to homicide charges based on speculative links between an old act and a later death.
Constitutional context
The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause requires that criminal prosecutions be fundamentally fair, which courts have applied to causation standards in homicide cases. The Double Jeopardy Clause could be implicated if a defendant previously convicted of a lesser offense (e.g., assault) for the same act is later charged with homicide after the victim dies, though under Gamble v. United States (2019), the dual-sovereignty doctrine permits successive federal and state prosecutions for the same conduct.
Checks and balances
The federal judiciary gains no new authority; rather, federal prosecutors (executive branch) gain expanded charging discretion, with courts retaining the check of requiring proof of causation beyond a reasonable doubt at trial.
Historical precedent
Most U.S. states have already abolished the year-and-a-day rule by statute or judicial decision — for example, California abolished it legislatively in 1969, and the Tennessee Supreme Court abolished it judicially in State v. Rogers (1999), which the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed in Rogers v. Tennessee (2001).