HR-1701-119
Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
Sponsored by Bill Huizenga (R-MI)
What it does
This bill would require the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to jointly develop a global map of ports important to U.S. military, diplomatic, and economic interests, and to identify any efforts by China or Chinese-linked entities to build, buy, or control those ports. Within one year of enactment, the two departments would submit a report to Congress covering known Chinese port holdings, U.S. port vulnerabilities, Chinese maritime logistics tools (such as the LOGINK software platform), and suggested strategies for countering Chinese influence — including potential funding sources and a list of any additional legal authorities needed.
Who benefits
Congressional committees overseeing defense, foreign affairs, intelligence, and commerce, who would receive new structured intelligence on global port activity. U.S. military planners and combatant commands that would gain a formal strategic assessment. U.S. allies and partners whose port security interests are included in the study. American shipping companies and maritime logistics firms that could benefit from strategies countering Chinese-controlled port infrastructure. Federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs) that may be contracted to conduct the study. Domestic port operators and maritime infrastructure investors who could benefit from recommended alternative investment strategies.
Who is hurt
Chinese state-owned enterprises — particularly China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) — and other Chinese entities with port investments that would face increased U.S. scrutiny. Private investors with stakes in ports that have Chinese involvement, who may face future regulatory or diplomatic pressure stemming from the report's findings. Countries hosting Chinese-linked port investments that may experience increased U.S. diplomatic pressure. The Departments of State and Defense, which would bear the administrative and resource costs of conducting the study and mapping exercise. Taxpayers who would fund the study, though costs are not specified in the bill.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that China has systematically expanded its control over strategic ports worldwide — through COSCO, the Belt and Road Initiative, and digital logistics tools like LOGINK — creating potential chokepoints that could be used to restrict U.S. military access or disrupt global supply chains in a conflict scenario. They contend that the United States currently lacks a comprehensive, government-wide assessment of this threat, and that this bill fills a critical intelligence gap by requiring a structured, interagency analysis with actionable recommendations, without mandating any specific policy response that could be premature.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that the bill duplicates work already being conducted by the intelligence community, the Department of Defense, and the National Security Council, adding bureaucratic reporting requirements without new authorities or funding to act on the findings. They contend that singling out China by name in statute — rather than assessing all foreign state actors — may unnecessarily inflame diplomatic relations and constrain the executive branch's flexibility to manage foreign policy, potentially conflicting with the President's broad constitutional authority over foreign affairs recognized in Zivotofsky v. Kerry (2015).
Constitutional context
The Foreign Commerce Clause (Art. I, §8, cl. 3) gives Congress broad authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations, supporting legislation that monitors and responds to foreign control of maritime trade infrastructure. The bill also implicates the boundary between congressional oversight and executive foreign policy authority — while Congress may direct reporting and study requirements, Zivotofsky v. Kerry (2015) affirmed that the President holds exclusive recognition and foreign relations powers, meaning any future action flowing from this report would remain subject to executive discretion.
Checks and balances
Congress gains structured oversight authority over executive branch foreign port strategy; the executive branch (State and Defense) retains discretion over how the study is conducted and what policy actions, if any, to recommend or pursue.
Historical precedent
The National Defense Authorization Act has historically included similar port security and foreign infrastructure reporting requirements, though no single standalone statute has previously mandated a comprehensive global mapping of Chinese port acquisitions specifically.