Passed
360 Yea10 Nay61 Not voting2/3 required
HR-1709-119
Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
Sponsored by Greg Landsman (D-OH)
What it does
This bill would require the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information, in consultation with the Department of Homeland Security, to submit a report to Congress within one year examining cybersecurity vulnerabilities in mobile service networks. The report would cover topics including encryption strength, the use of cell-site simulators (devices that mimic cell towers to intercept communications), how well mobile carriers have addressed known vulnerabilities, and barriers to adopting stronger security practices. The bill explicitly excludes 5G networks from the study's scope and limits its focus to vulnerabilities that have been demonstrated or are feasibly exploitable in real-world conditions.
Who benefits
All U.S. mobile phone users who could benefit from improved network security awareness. Policymakers and congressional committees who would receive actionable intelligence on network vulnerabilities. Small and rural mobile service providers who are consulted and whose specific challenges may be highlighted. Cybersecurity researchers and academics whose findings would be formally incorporated. National security agencies that would gain a consolidated assessment of adversary surveillance capabilities. Companies and government agencies that rely on mobile networks for sensitive communications.
Who is hurt
Major mobile carriers (e.g., AT&T, Verizon, T-Mobile) whose security practices — or gaps in them — would be publicly assessed and potentially criticized. Device manufacturers and mobile operating system developers whose encryption and authentication practices would be scrutinized. The report could create reputational or regulatory risk for companies found to have unaddressed vulnerabilities. Taxpayers bear the administrative cost of producing the report. Foreign adversaries and unauthorized hackers whose surveillance tools and techniques (e.g., cell-site simulators) would be documented and potentially countered.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that mobile networks carry sensitive communications for hundreds of millions of Americans, yet known vulnerabilities — including those exploitable by foreign governments using cell-site simulators — remain unaddressed by carriers. They contend that a comprehensive, government-led assessment drawing on intelligence agencies, academic researchers, and industry experts is a necessary first step toward evidence-based policy, and that the bill's careful scoping (excluding 5G, limiting to real-world exploits, and allowing classified annexes) reflects a measured, targeted approach to a genuine national security gap.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that the bill produces only a study with no enforcement mechanism, meaning carriers face no obligation to act on its findings — making it a potentially costly exercise with limited practical impact on actual network security. They contend that existing agencies such as CISA, NIST, and the FCC already have authority and ongoing programs to assess mobile network vulnerabilities, and that duplicating this work through a new mandated report adds bureaucratic overhead without meaningfully accelerating security improvements for consumers.
Constitutional context
No significant constitutional tension is present. Congress has broad authority to regulate interstate telecommunications under the Commerce Clause (Art. I, §8, cl. 3), and directing an executive agency to produce a report is a well-established exercise of that authority. The bill's discussion of cell-site simulators — devices used to intercept mobile communications — touches on Fourth Amendment territory established in Carpenter v. United States (2018), which held that government acquisition of comprehensive digital records requires a warrant, though the bill itself does not authorize any surveillance.
Checks and balances
The executive branch (Assistant Secretary of Commerce/NTIA) gains a defined reporting obligation; Congress retains oversight through the receiving committees (House Energy and Commerce; Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation), and the bill imposes no new regulatory or enforcement authority on any agency.
Historical precedent
Congress has previously directed similar studies on telecommunications security, including provisions in the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019, which required assessments of vulnerabilities in communications infrastructure supplied by foreign adversaries.
Passed