HR-1736-119
Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.
Sponsored by August Pfluger (R-TX)
What it does
This bill would require the Secretary of Homeland Security, working with the Director of National Intelligence, to produce annual assessments for five years on how terrorist organizations use generative AI, including for propaganda, recruitment, and developing chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons. It also requires information-sharing between DHS, the FBI, intelligence agencies, and state/local fusion centers, and requires an unclassified version of each assessment to be posted publicly with a classified annex allowed.
Who benefits
Federal agencies (DHS, FBI, intelligence community) and state/local fusion centers gain structured intelligence products and clearer information-sharing channels. Congressional oversight committees receive regular briefings and data. The public may indirectly benefit from improved awareness of AI-related terrorism risks and any resulting countermeasures.
Who is hurt
No group bears a direct material burden; the bill imposes reporting and coordination workload on DHS, ODNI, FBI, and fusion center staff, requiring additional analyst time and resources. AI companies could face increased regulatory scrutiny or public attention if identified in unclassified reports, though the bill creates no new obligations or penalties for them.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that generative AI's use by foreign terrorist organizations for recruitment, propaganda, and weapons development is a fast-evolving threat that current intelligence structures do not systematically track, and that a recurring, standardized assessment would help policymakers respond with evidence rather than anecdote. They contend that mandating information-sharing with fusion centers would close gaps between federal intelligence and local law enforcement, similar to post-9/11 reforms.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that the bill creates another recurring reporting mandate without new resources, potentially straining DHS and fusion center capacity without a clear metric of success. They contend that broad information-sharing mandates involving fusion centers have historically raised privacy and civil liberties concerns, and that the bill's privacy safeguards are vague, relying on general references to "applicable law" rather than specific protections.