HR-1737-119
Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
Sponsored by Stacey Plaskett (D-VI)
What it does
This bill would require the Secretary of Commerce to submit a report to Congress within one year assessing the value, cost, and feasibility of building a trans-Atlantic submarine fiber optic cable connecting the contiguous United States, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Ghana, and Nigeria. The report would cover national security, digital security, economic opportunities, infrastructure readiness in the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the potential for a secure data center there. The bill explicitly prohibits the Secretary from compelling any private entity to provide data for the report.
Who benefits
Residents and businesses in the U.S. Virgin Islands, who may gain improved and more secure telecommunications infrastructure. U.S. military commands (Africa Command and Special Operations Command) that could gain more secure communications infrastructure. U.S. technology and telecommunications companies that could compete for contracts if a cable is eventually built. Ghana and Nigeria, which could gain improved connectivity to the U.S. and global internet. Policymakers and Congress, who would receive a structured assessment to inform future decisions. Researchers and think tanks studying U.S.-Africa digital infrastructure.
Who is hurt
Existing submarine cable operators whose market position could be disrupted if a new government-backed cable is eventually built. Entities deemed "not trusted" under the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 — primarily Chinese telecommunications firms — who would be excluded from any future project. Taxpayers who would bear the cost of the study and, potentially, any future cable construction. Competing infrastructure priorities that may receive less attention or funding if this project advances.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that the U.S. Virgin Islands' existing submarine cables are aging and that the territory's telecommunications security is a genuine vulnerability for both residents and U.S. military operations in the Atlantic and Africa. They contend that China has aggressively expanded its submarine cable footprint globally, and that a U.S.-backed cable to West Africa would counter that influence while opening economic opportunities — all at the low initial cost of a study that carries no spending commitment.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that the federal government already has access to extensive private-sector assessments of submarine cable infrastructure, making a mandated Commerce Department study duplicative and an inefficient use of agency resources. They contend that the bill's framing around specific countries and military commands may prejudge the study's conclusions, and that without any funding mechanism or construction authority, the report is unlikely to produce actionable results beyond signaling geopolitical intent.
Constitutional context
No significant constitutional issues are raised by this bill. Congress has broad authority under the Commerce Clause (Art. I, §8, cl. 3) to direct executive agencies to study telecommunications infrastructure. Directing the Secretary of Commerce to produce a report is a routine exercise of congressional oversight and does not implicate Fourth Amendment digital privacy, First Amendment content moderation, or other active constitutional tension areas.
Checks and balances
The executive branch (Secretary of Commerce) gains a directed task but no new regulatory or spending authority; Congress retains full control over any follow-on action, as the bill creates no funding mechanism or construction mandate.
Historical precedent
Congress has previously directed executive agencies to study telecommunications infrastructure needs, including submarine cable security assessments under the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019, though no directly analogous trans-Atlantic cable feasibility study has been mandated by statute.