HR-1765-119
Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
Sponsored by Thomas Kean (R-NJ)
What it does
This bill would direct the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information, in consultation with NIST and the State Department, to encourage U.S. companies and stakeholders to participate in international wireless communications standards-setting bodies (such as 3GPP, IEEE, and ISO) and to offer them technical expertise to support that participation. It would exclude any company or stakeholder the Assistant Secretary determines poses a national security threat — defined by reference to existing executive branch determinations, Commerce Department orders, and the 2019 NDAA's list of covered telecommunications equipment providers. The Assistant Secretary would also be required to brief four congressional committees within 60 days on a strategy to carry out these activities.
Who benefits
U.S. telecommunications companies (e.g., Qualcomm, Intel, Ericsson's U.S. operations) that compete in global wireless standards processes. U.S. technology industry broadly, which benefits when American firms shape technical standards. Smaller U.S. firms and academic institutions that may gain access to government technical expertise they could not otherwise afford. U.S. national security interests, to the extent American influence in standards bodies reduces the influence of companies deemed security threats. Allied nations whose companies participate in the same standards bodies alongside U.S. firms.
Who is hurt
Companies and stakeholders designated as "not trusted" — primarily Chinese telecommunications firms such as Huawei and ZTE — who would be explicitly excluded from U.S. government-facilitated participation. Foreign companies not on any exclusion list but competing with U.S. firms for influence in standards bodies, who may face a better-resourced American presence. U.S. government agencies that must absorb the administrative costs of implementing the strategy and delivering congressional briefings. Potentially, standards bodies themselves if exclusions create friction in their consensus-based processes.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that China has systematically increased its influence in global wireless standards bodies — with Chinese companies submitting a disproportionate share of technical proposals to 3GPP in recent years — and that U.S. firms have been underrepresented relative to America's technological capabilities. They contend that whoever shapes 5G and next-generation wireless standards shapes the architecture of global communications infrastructure for decades, making active U.S. government facilitation a matter of both economic competitiveness and national security. The bill's exclusion of "not trusted" entities, they argue, ensures that U.S. government resources do not inadvertently assist companies already identified as security threats by multiple executive branch bodies.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that international standards bodies operate on voluntary, consensus-based principles, and that overt government coordination of private-sector participation could undermine the credibility and perceived neutrality of those bodies — potentially prompting other nations to retaliate by excluding U.S. firms or fragmenting global standards. They contend that the bill's "not trusted" exclusion mechanism, while grounded in existing determinations, grants the Assistant Secretary broad discretionary authority to bar companies from government assistance without a clear appeals process, raising due process concerns. Critics may also argue that U.S. companies already participate robustly in bodies like 3GPP and IEEE, and that the bill duplicates existing industry-led efforts without a demonstrated gap that government intervention would fill.
Constitutional context
The bill operates under Congress's Commerce Clause authority (Art. I, §8, cl. 3) to regulate foreign and interstate commerce, including international technology trade and standards. No significant Fourth or First Amendment issues are raised, as the bill involves government facilitation of voluntary private participation rather than surveillance or compelled speech. The post-Loper Bright environment is relevant: the bill delegates discretionary "not trusted" determinations to the Assistant Secretary, and courts would now independently assess whether that delegation is sufficiently clear if challenged.
Checks and balances
The executive branch (Assistant Secretary of Commerce) gains new coordinating authority over U.S. participation in international standards bodies; Congress checks this through a mandatory 60-day briefing requirement and oversight by four committees (House Energy and Commerce, House Foreign Affairs, Senate Commerce, and Senate Foreign Relations).
Historical precedent
The Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 similarly used executive branch national security determinations to exclude specific companies (primarily Huawei and ZTE) from U.S. government programs, establishing the "not trusted" framework this bill builds upon.