HR-20-119
Referred to the House Committee on Education and Workforce.
Sponsored by Robert Scott (D-VA)
What it does
This bill would substantially amend the National Labor Relations Act and related labor statutes, broadening who counts as an "employee" or "joint employer," speeding up union representation elections, imposing binding arbitration for first contracts, permitting mandatory union fees over state right-to-work laws, banning permanent replacement of striking workers, and adding civil penalties and private lawsuit rights for unfair labor practices. It would also require employers to give unions employee contact information, allow union use of employer electronic systems, and eliminate several existing employer defenses and procedural protections in NLRB proceedings.
Who benefits
Labor unions and their organizers; workers seeking to unionize, especially in industries with high turnover like retail, food service, and gig work; independent contractors reclassified as employees who would gain NLRA protections; workers in franchise and contracted arrangements who could now hold parent companies liable as joint employers; employees pursuing unfair labor practice claims, who would gain access to uncapped damages and private rights of action.
Who is hurt
Employers, particularly small businesses and franchisors, who would face expanded joint-employer liability, faster election timelines, mandatory arbitration of first contracts, and steep new civil penalties (up to $100,000 per violation) including potential personal liability for officers and directors; businesses in the 26 states with right-to-work laws, which would be preempted regarding mandatory union fees; companies relying on independent contractors, such as gig-economy platforms, which would face reclassification costs; employers who would lose the ability to permanently replace striking workers, potentially prolonging labor disputes.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue the bill restores meaningful bargaining power lost over decades of employer resistance, citing declining union density (from roughly 20% in 1983 to about 10% today) and studies showing delayed first-contract negotiations often result in no contract at all. They contend faster elections, binding arbitration deadlines, and stronger penalties are necessary because current NLRA remedies are too weak to deter unfair labor practices that chill organizing.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue the bill eliminates employer due process protections, imposes binding arbitration that overrides free contract negotiation, and preempts state right-to-work laws that 26 states have enacted to protect worker choice. They contend the expanded joint-employer standard and independent contractor test would impose massive compliance costs on franchises, small businesses, and gig platforms, potentially forcing reclassification of millions of contract workers and driving up costs across supply chains.
Constitutional context
The bill implicates Congress's Commerce Clause authority to regulate labor relations, upheld in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. (1937), and raises Tenth Amendment and preemption questions given its explicit override of state right-to-work laws. The self-enforcing Board orders and expanded civil penalty provisions may also raise Seventh Amendment jury-trial questions under the reasoning of SEC v. Jarkesy (2024) regarding agency adjudication of penalties.
Checks and balances
Congress would expand NLRB authority to adjudicate and enforce penalties with reduced judicial review (orders self-enforcing absent court override), shifting power from courts and employers toward the executive-branch labor board, while federal preemption of state right-to-work laws would reduce state legislative authority in this area.
Historical precedent
Similar comprehensive labor law reforms, including binding arbitration for first contracts and card-check-style provisions, were proposed in the Employee Free Choice Act (2009) and prior versions of the PRO Act (2019, 2021), none of which were enacted.