HR-2108-119
Referred to the House Committee on Ways and Means.
Sponsored by Danny Davis (D-IL)
What it does
This bill would create a TANF Program Integrity Unit within the Administration for Children and Families to monitor how subrecipients (organizations that receive TANF funds passed through states) spend those funds. It would appropriate $10 million per year for the unit's operations. If the unit finds that funds were intentionally misused, the bill would require the state involved to spend an additional amount equal to the misused funds on direct cash assistance to families below the federal poverty line, on top of any existing financial penalties.
Who benefits
Low-income families below 100% of the federal poverty line who would receive additional direct cash assistance when misuse is found. Legitimate TANF subrecipient organizations whose reputations are harmed by bad actors in the same space. Taxpayers broadly, if the oversight deters waste and fraud. State TANF administrators who want clearer federal guidance on subrecipient monitoring. Congressional oversight bodies that would receive annual reports on program integrity activities.
Who is hurt
Subrecipient organizations — nonprofits, contractors, and community groups — that receive TANF pass-through funds and would face increased federal scrutiny and compliance burdens. States, which would bear the administrative cost of additional reporting requirements and face financial liability (mandatory redirected spending) if a subrecipient in their network is found to have misused funds, even if the state itself did not misuse them. HHS, which must stand up a new unit and complete rulemaking within two years. Subrecipients operating in states with weaker monitoring infrastructure, who may face disproportionate scrutiny.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that TANF has a well-documented history of funds being diverted away from low-income families — a 2021 Mississippi scandal saw hundreds of millions in TANF funds spent on celebrity appearances, a volleyball facility, and payments to a former NFL quarterback, with minimal federal recourse. They contend that the current single-state audit system is insufficient to catch intentional subrecipient-level fraud, and that requiring misused funds to be redirected to direct cash assistance for families below the poverty line ensures that the intended beneficiaries are ultimately made whole.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that the bill creates a federal monitoring layer that effectively penalizes states for the conduct of private subrecipients they may not have been able to control, raising Spending Clause concerns about whether conditions are coercive under NFIB v. Sebelius (2012). They contend that the $10 million annual appropriation may be insufficient to staff a meaningful oversight unit, while the compliance and reporting burdens on states and subrecipients could divert administrative resources away from actually serving low-income families — producing bureaucratic overhead without proportionate fraud reduction.