HR-2458-119
Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
Sponsored by Frank Pallone (D-NJ)
What it does
This bill would amend the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 to bar the FCC from granting satellite system licenses, U.S. market access rulings, or earth station authorizations to any entity that produces or provides "covered communications equipment or service," or to its affiliates. It would apply to grants made on or after enactment and require the FCC to issue implementing rules within one year. "Covered" equipment is defined by the existing 2019 Act, which focuses on items from companies deemed national security risks.
Who benefits
U.S. and allied satellite operators that would face less competition from firms tied to covered equipment providers. National security and intelligence agencies concerned about foreign-linked equipment in satellite networks and ground infrastructure. Satellite broadband customers who may gain from networks with fewer supply-chain security concerns. Domestic equipment makers that could gain market share.
Who is hurt
Satellite operators and earth station owners with affiliates that produce covered equipment, who would lose access to FCC licenses and U.S. market entry. Foreign-linked satellite firms seeking to serve the U.S. market. Customers who might have used their services and could face fewer options or higher prices. The FCC, which would bear new rulemaking and compliance-review costs, and firms with complex corporate structures facing uncertainty over what counts as an "affiliate."
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that satellite networks and ground stations are critical infrastructure, and that the 2019 Act already recognizes risks from covered equipment providers in terrestrial networks. They contend that extending the ban to satellite licensing closes a gap, since a company flagged as a security risk on the ground could otherwise control space-based communications links. They also argue that acting at the licensing stage is cheaper and cleaner than removing equipment after deployment.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that the bill's broad "affiliate" reach could sweep in companies with only remote corporate ties to covered equipment providers, creating uncertainty for investment and innovation. They contend that the FCC already reviews national security concerns case by case, so a categorical bar removes flexibility and may reduce competition in satellite services. They also argue that a statutory ban could provoke retaliation against U.S. satellite firms abroad and may raise costs for consumers.
Constitutional context
Congress regulates spectrum and interstate and foreign communications under the Commerce Clause (Art. I, §8, cl. 3) and its foreign commerce power. Affected firms could raise Fifth Amendment due process claims over the vague "affiliate" reach and being barred without individualized hearings, though courts have generally deferred to national security-based restrictions on FCC licensing (closest analogue: FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 2009, on agency process, with uncertainty as to a direct anchor).
Checks and balances
Congress narrows FCC licensing discretion and directs rulemaking, shifting power from the agency toward statutory mandates; affected firms can seek judicial review of FCC implementing rules and license denials, and Congress retains oversight.
Historical precedent
The Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 and the 2020 Secure Equipment Act similarly restricted FCC funding and authorizations for covered equipment providers in terrestrial networks.