HR-2748-116
Placed on the Union Calendar, Calendar No. 385.
What it does
The SAFE Act would require the President to establish an interagency working group to adopt and periodically update a national strategy for helping fish, wildlife, and plants adapt to climate change and extreme weather. It would require every federal agency to integrate that strategy into their plans, environmental reviews, and programs. It would also direct the Department of the Interior to create a new National Climate Change and Wildlife Science Center and an advisory committee to support the strategy's development and implementation.
Who benefits
Hunters, anglers, and wildlife-dependent recreation industries that rely on stable fish and wildlife populations. Coastal and rural communities whose economies depend on healthy ecosystems. Conservation organizations and environmental researchers who would gain a formal federal coordination structure and dedicated science funding. Native American tribes with treaty rights tied to specific fish and wildlife species. Future generations who would inherit ecosystems shaped by today's adaptation decisions.
Who is hurt
Federal agencies that would face new mandatory planning and review requirements, potentially increasing administrative costs and workload. Private landowners and industries — including agriculture, energy, and real estate development — whose projects could face additional scrutiny during federal environmental reviews that incorporate the new strategy. Taxpayers who would fund the new Science Center, advisory committee, and interagency working group. States that may see federal strategy requirements overlap with or constrain their own wildlife management authority.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that fish, wildlife, and plant populations are already being disrupted by shifting temperatures, altered precipitation patterns, and more frequent extreme weather events, and that the federal government has a responsibility to coordinate a science-based response before species losses become irreversible. They contend that the bill does not impose new regulations on private parties but instead directs federal agencies to plan more coherently — using the same sound science already produced by the U.S. Global Change Research Program. Supporters also argue that healthy ecosystems underpin a multi-billion-dollar outdoor recreation economy, and that proactive adaptation planning is far less costly than emergency responses to ecosystem collapse. The interagency structure, they say, eliminates duplicative agency efforts and ensures that federal decisions are made with consistent, up-to-date scientific information.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that mandating every federal agency to integrate a single national strategy into all plans and environmental reviews would create a sweeping new layer of bureaucratic process that could slow permitting, increase litigation risk, and impose costs on industries that depend on timely federal approvals. They contend that wildlife management is constitutionally a state function, and that a presidentially directed interagency strategy effectively federalizes decisions that states and tribes are better positioned to make for their own landscapes. Critics also raise concerns that, after West Virginia v. EPA and Loper Bright, courts may find that the bill delegates broad, vaguely defined authority to agencies without the clear congressional authorization those decisions now require. Finally, opponents question whether a new Science Center and advisory committee duplicate existing programs at USGS, NOAA, and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, adding overhead without proportional scientific benefit.
Constitutional context
The bill rests primarily on Congress's Commerce Clause authority (Art. I, §8), which the Supreme Court has long held extends to regulation of wildlife and ecosystems with interstate and international dimensions (see Massachusetts v. EPA, 2007, affirming EPA's authority to regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act). The Tenth Amendment is relevant because wildlife management has traditionally been a state function; the bill's mandate that federal agencies integrate the strategy into their programs could raise anti-commandeering questions if read to direct state agencies. Post-Loper Bright (2024), courts will independently review any agency interpretation of the strategy's scope rather than deferring to agency readings. Under West Virginia v. EPA (2022), the major questions doctrine requires clear congressional authorization for agency actions of vast economic and political significance — a standard that could be applied to broad "integrate into all programs" mandates. Sackett v. EPA (2023) signals judicial skepticism toward expansive federal jurisdiction over land and water without explicit statutory text.
Checks and balances
The bill shifts authority toward the Executive Branch by vesting the President with power to establish and direct an interagency working group, and by directing the Department of the Interior to create a new federal science center and advisory body. Congress retains oversight through appropriations and the requirement that the strategy be grounded in periodic scientific assessments produced under existing statute (the U.S. Global Change Research Program). The mandatory agency integration requirement expands Executive Branch reach across all federal planning processes, while the advisory committee structure introduces a consultative check on the working group's decisions.
Historical precedent
The 1973 Endangered Species Act similarly directed multiple federal agencies to integrate species-protection requirements into all agency actions (Section 7 consultation). The 2008 National Fish Habitat Conservation Through Partnerships Act established a comparable interagency coordination structure for aquatic habitat. The 2013 National Fish, Wildlife, and Plants Climate Adaptation Strategy — which this bill would codify and make binding — was produced voluntarily by federal and state agencies without a statutory mandate.