HR-2924-119
Referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary.
Sponsored by Andy Barr (R-KY)
What it does
This bill would require the Department of State to stop issuing visas to citizens, nationals, subjects, and residents of any NATO member country that does not spend at least 2% of its gross domestic product (GDP) on national defense. The visa ban would apply to all visa categories for nationals of non-compliant NATO members. The bill does not specify a waiver process, phase-in period, or mechanism for restoring visa access once a country meets the 2% threshold.
Who benefits
U.S. defense hawks and policymakers who argue NATO allies have long underfunded their defense commitments. U.S. defense contractors and military industries that could benefit from increased allied defense spending if the bill pressures NATO members to raise budgets. American workers in industries where visa-holding foreign nationals from NATO countries compete for jobs. Advocates of stricter immigration controls who support reducing overall visa issuance.
Who is hurt
Citizens and residents of NATO member countries that currently spend below 2% of GDP on defense — as of 2024, roughly two-thirds of NATO's 32 members fall below this threshold, including major allies such as Germany, Italy, Spain, Canada, and Belgium. This would affect millions of travelers, students, workers, tourists, and business visitors from those countries. U.S. universities and research institutions that enroll large numbers of students from NATO countries. U.S. businesses and multinational corporations that rely on workers and executives from allied nations. The U.S. tourism and hospitality industry, which benefits from European and Canadian visitors. Families with members in affected countries seeking to visit or reunite. U.S. diplomatic and military relationships with NATO allies could be strained, indirectly affecting national security cooperation.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that NATO's 2% GDP defense spending guideline — formally agreed to by all members at the 2014 Wales Summit — has been chronically ignored by most allies, leaving the United States to shoulder a disproportionate share of collective defense costs. They contend that conventional diplomatic pressure has failed to produce compliance over more than a decade, and that linking visa access to defense commitments creates a concrete, enforceable incentive for allies to meet their own pledges. With U.S. defense spending consistently exceeding 3% of GDP, supporters argue American taxpayers are effectively subsidizing the security of wealthy European nations that have the economic capacity to meet the 2% standard.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that using visa restrictions as leverage against treaty allies would severely damage the diplomatic relationships and interoperability that make NATO effective, potentially weakening the alliance at a moment of heightened security threats. They contend the bill would harm millions of ordinary civilians — students, tourists, and workers — who have no role in their governments' defense budget decisions, and that punishing allied populations is both disproportionate and counterproductive. Critics also note that the 2% guideline was never a legally binding treaty obligation, and that many allies contribute to NATO through non-monetary means such as hosting U.S. bases, providing specialized capabilities, and deploying troops to NATO missions.
Constitutional context
The Naturalization Clause (Art. I, §8, cl. 4) grants Congress broad authority over immigration, including visa policy. Under Trump v. Hawaii (2018), the President and Congress have wide discretion to restrict entry of foreign nationals, with courts applying only rational basis review. However, the mandatory "shall discontinue" language removes executive discretion, raising potential separation of powers questions about whether Congress can fully eliminate the President's flexibility in conducting foreign affairs under Art. II.
Checks and balances
Congress would gain direct control over visa policy toward NATO allies, removing State Department and executive branch discretion; the primary check is presidential veto power, and courts would likely apply highly deferential rational basis review to any challenge given the plenary power doctrine over immigration.
Historical precedent
The Immigration and Nationality Act §1182(f) has been used by presidents to restrict entry from specific countries (e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 2018), but Congress has not previously conditioned visa access on allied nations' defense spending levels.