HR-2973-118
Ordered to be Reported (Amended) by the Yeas and Nays: 42 - 0.
What it does
The MARITIME Act of 2023 would direct the Department of Defense to work toward building a coordinated maritime surveillance and interdiction capability in the Middle East aimed at countering specified maritime threats in the region. It would also require DOD to deliver to Congress a strategy for achieving that capability alongside regional partners and allies, and a feasibility study on creating a dedicated fund — potentially drawing contributions from allied and partner nations — to finance the effort.
Who benefits
U.S. military and naval forces operating in the Middle East, who would receive clearer strategic direction and potentially new resources. Regional allies and partner nations whose shipping lanes and maritime security interests align with U.S. goals. Commercial shipping companies and crews transiting Middle Eastern waterways, who could benefit from reduced maritime threats. U.S. consumers and businesses that depend on goods moving through those shipping lanes.
Who is hurt
U.S. taxpayers, who could bear costs if a new fund is established and U.S. contributions are required. DOD personnel and planners, who would face new reporting and strategy-development mandates. Potentially, adversarial state and non-state actors whose maritime activities in the region are the target of the interdiction capability. Congressional appropriators, whose discretion over related spending could be constrained if a dedicated fund is created.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that maritime threats in the Middle East — including weapons smuggling, attacks on commercial vessels, and terrorism — pose a direct risk to U.S. national security interests and global trade. They contend that a unified, integrated maritime awareness and interdiction capability would fill a critical gap in regional security architecture, making U.S. and allied forces more effective and better coordinated. Requiring a formal strategy and feasibility study, they argue, ensures that any new capability is developed deliberately and with congressional oversight rather than through ad hoc measures. Supporters also note that the bill's emphasis on burden-sharing with allies and partners could reduce the financial load on U.S. taxpayers while strengthening multilateral security relationships.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that the bill could draw the United States deeper into open-ended military commitments in the Middle East without a clear definition of the threats being targeted or the conditions under which the mission would conclude. They contend that creating a new dedicated fund — even one drawing on allied contributions — risks establishing a parallel financing mechanism that reduces transparency and congressional control over defense spending. Critics may also argue that existing U.S. naval assets and command structures, such as U.S. Central Command, already address regional maritime security, making a new capability redundant and potentially wasteful. Others may raise concerns that the bill's broad mandate could be used to justify military actions beyond its stated counterterrorism scope.
Constitutional context
The bill operates within the foreign policy and national security framework of the Constitution. Relevant provisions include Article I, Section 8 (Congress's power to regulate foreign commerce, declare war, raise and support armies, and provide and maintain a navy) and Article II, Section 2 (the President's role as Commander-in-Chief). The bill's requirement for DOD to report a strategy to Congress reflects the ongoing tension between executive operational authority and legislative oversight. The feasibility study on a new fund touches on Congress's appropriations power under Article I, Section 9. Relevant cases include Zivotofsky v. Kerry (2015), which addressed the boundary between executive and legislative authority in foreign affairs, and Trump v. Hawaii (2018), which affirmed broad executive discretion in national security matters.
Checks and balances
The bill modestly shifts informational authority toward Congress by mandating that the executive branch (DOD) produce and deliver both a strategy and a feasibility study, preserving legislative oversight over the planning process. However, the core operational authority to develop and deploy the maritime capability would remain with the executive branch. If a dedicated fund were ultimately established, Congress would likely need to authorize and appropriate funds, preserving its power of the purse. No significant unilateral shift of power to either branch is created by the bill as introduced.
Historical precedent
The bill is broadly similar to past congressional mandates requiring DOD to develop regional security strategies and submit feasibility studies, such as provisions in various National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs) directing strategy development for the Indo-Pacific or counterterrorism operations. The concept of a multilateral security fund with allied contributions has precedent in NATO common funding arrangements and the European Deterrence Initiative.