HR-3083-119
Referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary.
Sponsored by Norma Torres (D-CA)
What it does
This bill would direct the Attorney General to increase a state's Sexual Assault Services Program formula grant, by up to 20 percent of its average award over the three most recent awards, if the state has a law allowing civil lawsuits for damages and equitable relief against a person who removes a sexual protection barrier (such as a condom or dental dam) without the consent of each person involved. The increase would last 4 years and could be given to a state no more than 4 times. It would authorize $5 million per year for fiscal years 2026 through 2030. It does not create a federal cause of action or require any state to act.
Who benefits
People subjected to nonconsensual barrier removal ('stealthing') in states that adopt civil remedies, who would gain a route to damages and court orders. Sexual assault service providers in participating states, which could receive larger Sexual Assault Services Program awards. State officials who want to enact such laws and would receive a federal funding incentive. Public health interests concerned about unintended pregnancy and sexually transmitted infection exposure.
Who is hurt
People accused of nonconsensual barrier removal in participating states, who would face civil liability and possible court orders on a lower burden of proof than criminal cases. States that do not adopt such laws would not receive the increase, and sexual assault programs in those states could be comparatively disadvantaged. State courts could see added civil caseloads. Federal taxpayers would bear the $5 million per year in authorized costs, and the Department of Justice would take on administrative work. Because the $5 million is a fixed cap, awards could be limited if many states qualify.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that nonconsensual condom removal is a recognized form of sexual violation that many state laws do not clearly address, leaving victims without remedies for physical, emotional, and health harms. They contend a voluntary grant incentive respects state authority, costs only $5 million annually, and uses an existing program to encourage states to create civil remedies that victims can pursue on their own.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that tying grant increases to specific state tort laws pressures states to adopt a federal policy preference, and that a small appropriation split among states may produce little real effect. They contend that civil liability for conduct within private encounters raises proof and evidence difficulties, may invite disputed claims, and that funds would be better directed to existing services or left to states to prioritize.
Constitutional context
Congress offers this incentive under its Spending Clause power (Art. I, §8, cl. 1), which allows conditions on federal grants if they are clearly stated and related to the program's purpose, as in South Dakota v. Dole (1987). Because the funding is optional and limited to up to 20 percent, it is unlikely to be coercive under NFIB v. Sebelius (2012). Defining the tort itself remains with the states.
Checks and balances
The executive branch (Attorney General) gains discretion to review state laws and award grant increases, while Congress controls the funding level and conditions, and courts could review administrative decisions or state law challenges.
Historical precedent
Congress has previously used Violence Against Women Act grant conditions to encourage state policy changes, though no federal grant program tied specifically to civil remedies for condom removal is known to exist.