HR-3151-119
Referred to the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation.
Sponsored by Trent Kelly (R-MS)
What it does
This bill would create new federal offices (a Maritime Security Advisor and Maritime Security Board) to coordinate maritime policy, establish a Maritime Security Trust Fund financed partly by tonnage taxes, and expand financial incentives, tax credits, cargo preference rules, and workforce programs to support U.S.-flagged vessels, shipyards, and merchant mariners. It also directs new reporting, regulatory reform, and cargo-preference enforcement across multiple federal agencies including the Maritime Administration, Coast Guard, Federal Maritime Commission, and Department of Defense.
Who benefits
U.S. shipyards and shipbuilders, domestic vessel operators and owners, merchant mariners and maritime academy students, labor unions representing mariners and shipyard workers, and defense contractors involved in sealift capacity. Agricultural exporters relying on cargo preference financing and companies eligible for new tax credits under Title VII would also benefit, as would coastal and port communities seeing infrastructure and workforce investment.
Who is hurt
Foreign shipping companies and carriers, particularly those from China, who would face new restrictions, tariffs, or exclusion from certain cargo markets. U.S. importers and exporters who rely on cheaper foreign-flagged vessels may face higher shipping costs due to cargo preference and vessel-of-the-United-States requirements. Taxpayers would bear the cost of new trust fund appropriations, tax credits, and loan guarantee programs, and federal agencies would face new administrative and compliance burdens.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that U.S.-flagged oceangoing vessels now carry less than 2% of American international cargo and that the domestic shipbuilding industry has shrunk from 80 shipyards after World War II to just 20 today, creating a national security vulnerability given China's 230-times greater shipbuilding capacity. They contend that coordinated federal investment in shipyards, tax incentives, cargo preference, and mariner workforce pipelines is necessary to rebuild strategic sealift capacity essential for wartime logistics and to reduce reliance on foreign-controlled shipping.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that expanding cargo preference requirements and tonnage taxes would raise shipping costs for U.S. businesses and consumers by forcing more cargo onto typically more expensive U.S.-flagged vessels, echoing longstanding criticism of the Jones Act framework. They contend that creating a new White House maritime office, a twenty-agency advisory board, and a decade of trust-fund appropriations risks bureaucratic duplication and locks in subsidies for shipbuilders without guaranteed competitiveness gains relative to foreign shipyards.
Constitutional context
Congress's authority to regulate maritime commerce, impose tonnage duties, and structure cargo preference rests on the Commerce Clause (Art. I, §8, cl. 3) and Congress's power over navigation, with courts historically deferring to broad congressional authority over interstate and foreign shipping similar to the aggregation logic in Wickard v. Filburn (1942); the creation of a new executive advisory office also implicates the President's appointment and removal authority under Article II.
Checks and balances
Congress creates new executive branch offices and appropriates trust fund spending while directing extensive agency rulemaking and reporting; the President appoints the Maritime Security Advisor and Board chair, and Congress retains oversight through mandatory reports, GAO reviews, and committee notification requirements.
Historical precedent
This builds on longstanding maritime policy frameworks such as the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 and the Jones Act's cargo preference and cabotage requirements, which similarly sought to protect and subsidize domestic shipping and shipbuilding.