Passed
402 Yea0 Nay28 Not voting2/3 required
HR-3425-119
Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.
Sponsored by Mike Kennedy (R-UT)
What it does
This bill would require the Director of the Federal Protective Service (FPS) to establish improved oversight processes for contract security personnel guarding federal buildings managed by the General Services Administration. Within one year, the FPS Director would need to standardize covert testing data collection, conduct quarterly reviews of test results, require corrective training plans for guards who fail tests, and update security training guidance. Within 180 days, the Director would also need to evaluate and potentially replace or fix the current personnel tracking system used to monitor guard deployment, and improve communication to building tenants about security coverage gaps. The bill requires annual reports to Congress on both efforts.
Who benefits
Federal employees and contractors who work in GSA-managed buildings and would benefit from more reliable security coverage. Members of the public who visit federal buildings. Building tenants (federal agencies) who would receive better communication about security gaps. Taxpayers, if improved oversight reduces waste from underperforming security contracts. Security contractors who perform well and could gain competitive advantage over lower-performing rivals. Inspectors general and congressional oversight committees who would receive structured annual reporting.
Who is hurt
Security contractors whose personnel frequently fail covert tests and who would face mandatory corrective action plans and increased scrutiny. Contract security guards who fail covert tests and would be required to undergo additional training. Vendors of the current FPS personnel tracking system, who could lose the contract if the system is replaced. Potentially, taxpayers who bear the cost of system replacement or upgrades, though the bill does not appropriate specific funds for this purpose.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that the Government Accountability Office and FPS's own inspector general have repeatedly documented failures in FPS's oversight of contract security guards, including guards who failed covert screening tests with no consistent follow-up. They contend that standardizing data collection, mandating corrective training, and modernizing the personnel tracking system would directly address documented vulnerabilities in the security of hundreds of federal buildings that house sensitive government operations and thousands of federal workers.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that the bill adds layers of reporting and process requirements without appropriating dedicated funding, potentially creating unfunded mandates that strain FPS's existing administrative capacity. They contend that directing contractors to develop their own corrective training plans — subject only to FPS review — may produce inconsistent outcomes, and that without enforceable performance standards tied to contract termination authority, the new oversight processes could become a compliance exercise rather than a meaningful security improvement.
Constitutional context
No significant constitutional tension is present. Congress has clear authority to set management and oversight requirements for federal executive agencies and their contractors under Article I and the Necessary and Proper Clause. This bill directs an executive branch agency (FPS, within DHS) to improve internal processes, which falls squarely within Congress's power to structure and oversee the executive branch.
Checks and balances
The executive branch (FPS Director) gains structured administrative authority over contractor performance; Congress retains oversight through mandatory annual reports to the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee and the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee.
Historical precedent
The Federal Protective Service Improvement Act of 2010 similarly directed FPS to strengthen oversight of its contract guard workforce following GAO findings of widespread covert test failures, establishing a direct legislative precedent for this type of corrective mandate.
Passed