HR-3716-119
Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.
Sponsored by Al Green (D-TX)
What it does
This bill would require banking regulators to submit two reports to Congress — at 90 and 210 days — after any bank failure that triggers a systemic risk determination by the Treasury Department. Those reports must cover supervisory history, executive and board mismanagement, regulatory shortcomings, and recommendations for similarly situated banks. Separately, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) would be required to produce its own independent reports at 60 and 180 days covering the same events, including a review of the failed institution's executive compensation practices.
Who benefits
Members of Congress who would receive structured, timely information about major bank failures. Depositors and the general public who would gain greater transparency into how and why systemically significant banks fail. Journalists, researchers, and watchdog organizations that could use the public reports. Smaller, well-managed banks that could benefit from regulatory recommendations applied to similarly situated institutions. Future bank customers and investors who may benefit from improved oversight practices identified through the review process.
Who is hurt
Banking executives and board members whose decisions would be subject to formal public scrutiny and documented in congressional reports. Banking regulators (FDIC, OCC, Federal Reserve) whose supervisory shortcomings would be formally documented and reported. Institutions identified as "similarly situated" to a failed bank, which could face increased regulatory attention based on report recommendations. Taxpayers who fund the GAO and regulatory agencies that would bear the administrative cost of producing multiple reports under tight deadlines.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that the 2023 failures of Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank — both of which triggered systemic risk determinations — exposed serious gaps in congressional oversight, with lawmakers relying on fragmented, delayed information to understand what went wrong. They contend that structured, time-bound reporting requirements would ensure Congress receives consistent, comparable data after each such event, enabling more informed legislative responses and holding both bank executives and their regulators publicly accountable for failures that ultimately cost the Deposit Insurance Fund billions of dollars.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that mandatory public reporting on supervisory shortcomings and compensation practices could compromise ongoing legal proceedings, discourage candid internal regulatory assessments, and create litigation risk for regulators who must document their own failures under tight deadlines. They contend that existing oversight mechanisms — including GAO's discretionary authority to investigate bank failures and congressional committee hearings — already provide Congress with the information this bill mandates, making the new reporting requirements duplicative and potentially counterproductive during the sensitive period immediately following a systemic bank failure.
Constitutional context
No significant constitutional tension exists here. Congress has broad authority under the Commerce Clause (Art. I, §8, cl. 3) to regulate banking and financial institutions, and the power to require executive branch agencies to report to Congress is well-established under Congress's oversight and appropriations authority. This bill does not delegate new rulemaking power to agencies, so the major questions doctrine (West Virginia v. EPA, 2022) and post-Chevron scrutiny (Loper Bright, 2024) are not implicated.
Checks and balances
Congress gains structured, recurring information from both banking regulators and the independent GAO, strengthening legislative oversight of the executive branch; the GAO's independent reporting role serves as a check on the regulators' self-assessments.
Historical precedent
Following the 2008 financial crisis, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (2010), which included extensive reporting and transparency requirements for regulators, and the GAO conducted multiple mandated reviews of the Federal Reserve's emergency lending programs.