HR-4746-119
Referred to the Committee on Ways and Means, and in addition to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
Sponsored by Derek Tran (D-CA)
What it does
This bill would prohibit the President from using authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to impose tariffs on specified baby-related items, including baby formula, baby bottles, and breast pumps. It would also require the President to immediately terminate any such tariffs already in effect on these items at the time of enactment. Additionally, it would bar the President from using any other authority to impose tariffs on these items that are substantially similar to IEEPA-based tariffs.
Who benefits
Parents and caregivers of infants, particularly lower-income families who spend a higher share of income on baby formula and feeding supplies. Domestic retailers and distributors of baby food products who would face lower import costs. Hospitals and neonatal care facilities that purchase formula and feeding equipment in bulk. Manufacturers of baby products in countries currently subject to IEEPA tariffs who would regain U.S. market access. Consumers broadly, who may see lower retail prices on covered items if cost reductions are passed through the supply chain.
Who is hurt
Domestic manufacturers of baby formula, bottles, and breast pumps who currently benefit from tariff protection against foreign competition and may face increased import competition. The executive branch would lose a specific tool of economic leverage over these product categories. U.S. trade negotiators who use tariffs as bargaining chips in broader trade negotiations may have reduced flexibility. Workers in domestic baby product manufacturing facilities could face competitive pressure if lower-cost imports increase market share.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that IEEPA was designed for national security emergencies, not to raise consumer prices on infant nutrition and feeding supplies, and that applying it to baby food imposes a direct financial burden on families with newborns — one of the most cost-sensitive household periods. They contend that baby formula already experienced severe supply shortages in 2022, and that adding tariff costs to a fragile supply chain risks both affordability and availability for the most vulnerable consumers: infants who have no dietary alternative.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that Congress should not carve out product-by-product exceptions to presidential trade authority, as doing so undermines the executive's ability to conduct coherent trade policy and use tariffs as leverage in broader negotiations that may ultimately benefit American families. They contend that selectively removing tariffs on specific goods — rather than addressing trade policy comprehensively — sets a precedent for piecemeal congressional interference with executive foreign commerce powers, potentially weakening the U.S. negotiating position across multiple trade relationships simultaneously.
Constitutional context
The Foreign Commerce Clause (Art. I, §8, cl. 3) gives Congress the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, including the authority to delegate tariff-setting power to the executive — and to limit or reclaim that delegation. This bill directly tests the boundary between Congress's commerce power and the President's IEEPA authority; recent legal debate over whether IEEPA authorizes broad tariff imposition (beyond its traditional sanctions use) makes this constitutionally significant, though no Supreme Court case has yet resolved the precise scope of IEEPA tariff authority.
Checks and balances
Congress would gain authority by restricting the executive's tariff-setting power over specific goods; the check on Congress is that the President retains all other trade authorities not covered by this bill, and could veto the legislation.
Historical precedent
Congress has previously exempted specific goods from presidential trade actions, such as carve-outs in various sanctions regimes for humanitarian goods, but a direct statutory prohibition on IEEPA tariffs for a specific consumer product category has no clear direct precedent.