HR-4814-119
Referred to the House Committee on Ways and Means.
Sponsored by James Moylan (R-GU)
What it does
This bill would extend the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program—federal cash assistance for low-income elderly, blind, and disabled individuals—to Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa, territories currently excluded from full SSI coverage. It repeals the statutory cap on total payments to territories and treats U.S. nationals the same as citizens for eligibility purposes. It also gives the Commissioner of Social Security waiver authority to modify program requirements to adapt SSI to each territory's needs, with the changes taking effect at least one year after enactment.
Who benefits
Elderly, blind, and disabled low-income residents of Puerto Rico, Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and American Samoa who currently receive only the more limited Aid to the Aged, Blind, and Disabled (AABD) program instead of full SSI; territorial governments that currently bear costs for AABD; local economies in these territories that would see increased federal cash inflows; disability and civil rights advocates who have long argued the exclusion is inequitable.
Who is hurt
Federal taxpayers generally, who would bear the cost of extending a new federal entitlement to roughly 4 million territorial residents; the federal budget, which would face new mandatory spending obligations; potentially residents of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, which is not included in this extension and may see its exclusion become more visible.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that residents of these territories are U.S. citizens or nationals who pay federal payroll taxes in many respects yet are denied SSI, forcing them onto the less generous AABD program with lower benefit caps and stricter limits. They contend this creates an inequitable two-tier system, citing that Puerto Rico's per-capita disability and elderly poverty rates exceed those in every U.S. state, and that extending SSI would provide direct, well-targeted relief to some of the nation's most vulnerable low-income populations.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that extending a new federal entitlement program to roughly 4 million additional residents carries substantial and uncertain long-term costs that Congress has not fully offset, potentially adding tens of billions of dollars to federal spending over a decade. They contend that broad waiver authority given to the Commissioner of Social Security to modify statutory requirements for territories could reduce congressional control over program design and create inconsistent implementation across jurisdictions.
Constitutional context
Congress's power to extend or withhold SSI from the territories rests on the Territorial Clause (Art. IV, §3, cl. 2) combined with the Taxing and Spending Clause (Art. I, §8, cl. 1); in United States v. Vaello Madero (2022), the Supreme Court upheld Congress's authority to exclude Puerto Rico residents from SSI, finding no equal protection violation given the territories' distinct tax treatment, though several justices questioned the fairness of that distinction.
Checks and balances
Congress would exercise its spending and territorial powers to expand the program, while delegating implementation flexibility to the Commissioner of Social Security through waiver authority, which remains subject to congressional oversight and judicial review of agency action.
Historical precedent
Congress extended full SSI-equivalent benefits to the Northern Mariana Islands under a separate covenant arrangement, and periodic legislative proposals to extend SSI to Puerto Rico and other territories have been introduced in prior Congresses without enactment.