HR-5490-119
Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
Sponsored by Jefferson Shreve (R-IN)
What it does
This bill would require the President to determine whether 43 named foreign individuals or entities — and any others the President identifies — are subject to existing U.S. sanctions law for running online financial scams against Americans, and to impose applicable sanctions (such as freezing U.S.-based property transactions) upon that determination. It would also require the President to establish an interagency task force to develop and implement a strategy to shut down transnational criminal scam centers that use trafficked forced laborers. The task force would be required to submit a strategy to Congress within a set timeframe and annual progress reports for five years. The Department of State would be authorized to provide trauma-informed care, shelter, and reintegration services for trafficking victims found in these scam centers.
Who benefits
American consumers who are targets of online financial scams, particularly older adults who are disproportionately victimized by such schemes. Victims of human trafficking and forced labor held in overseas scam centers, who would gain access to State Department support services. U.S. financial institutions and payment processors that bear fraud-related costs. Law enforcement and intelligence agencies that would receive a formal coordination structure. Families of trafficking victims abroad.
Who is hurt
The 43 specifically named foreign persons and any others designated, who would have U.S.-accessible assets frozen and face other sanctions consequences. Foreign businesses or associates with financial ties to designated individuals who could face secondary effects. Countries hosting scam centers — primarily in Southeast Asia — whose diplomatic relationships with the U.S. could be strained. U.S. agencies that would bear implementation and reporting costs. Potentially, foreign nationals working in scam centers under coercion who could face collateral disruption during enforcement operations.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that online scam syndicates — many operating out of Southeast Asia — have defrauded Americans of billions of dollars annually, with the FBI's 2023 Internet Crime Report documenting over $12.5 billion in losses from internet crime. They contend that these operations rely on trafficked forced laborers and constitute a dual humanitarian and financial threat that existing voluntary executive action has failed to adequately address, making a statutory mandate for sanctions and a coordinated interagency strategy necessary to force sustained government action.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that mandating specific sanctions determinations by Congress — rather than leaving them to executive discretion — intrudes on the President's constitutional authority over foreign affairs and may produce diplomatic friction with partner nations whose cooperation is essential to actually dismantling these networks. They contend that naming 43 specific individuals in statute is an inflexible approach that could complicate ongoing law enforcement operations, tip off targets, or lock in designations that intelligence agencies may later need to revisit as criminal networks evolve.
Constitutional context
The bill implicates the separation of powers between Congress and the Executive in foreign affairs. While Congress has broad authority under the Foreign Commerce Clause (Art. I, §8, cl. 3) to regulate foreign economic activity and to legislate sanctions frameworks, Zivotofsky v. Kerry (2015) affirmed that the President holds significant exclusive authority in foreign relations. Mandating specific sanctions determinations by statute tests the boundary between Congress's power to set foreign policy conditions and the President's executive discretion — though courts have generally upheld congressionally directed sanctions regimes under existing frameworks like IEEPA and the Magnitsky Act.
Checks and balances
The Executive branch gains a formal mandate and new task force authority, but Congress retains oversight through required strategy submissions and five years of annual progress reports; the President retains discretion in how sanctions are implemented and how the strategy is designed.
Historical precedent
The Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (2016) established a similar congressional mandate for the President to impose sanctions on specific categories of foreign human rights violators and corrupt actors, and has survived legal and diplomatic challenges while serving as the primary model for targeted individual sanctions regimes.