HR-5698-119
Referred to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.
Sponsored by Eleanor Norton (D-DC)
What it does
This bill would authorize the District of Columbia's local government to pass its own laws governing clemency — pardons, reprieves, commutations of sentences, and remissions of fines or financial penalties — for violations of DC's own criminal laws. Currently, clemency power for DC criminal offenses rests with the President of the United States. The bill would transfer that authority to DC's local legislative and executive institutions.
Who benefits
DC residents convicted of local criminal offenses who seek clemency, as their petitions would be reviewed by locally accountable officials rather than the federal executive. DC's elected government, which would gain a new area of legislative and executive authority. Criminal justice advocates who have sought greater DC self-governance. Individuals serving sentences or paying fines under DC law who may find a more accessible or responsive clemency process. DC residents broadly, who would gain a voice in clemency policy through their elected representatives.
Who is hurt
The President and the federal executive branch would lose an existing constitutional clemency power over DC offenses. Victims of DC crimes who may prefer the current federal oversight structure and view presidential clemency as a higher, more insulated check. Those who believe federal oversight of DC's criminal justice system provides an important accountability layer. Federal officials and agencies currently involved in processing DC clemency petitions, whose role would be reduced or eliminated.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that DC residents are uniquely disadvantaged compared to citizens of every U.S. state, whose governors hold clemency power for state offenses — forcing DC residents to petition the President of the United States for relief from local criminal convictions. They contend this arrangement is an anomaly of DC's non-state status that produces practical barriers: presidential clemency pipelines are long, politically driven, and rarely prioritize local DC cases, leaving deserving individuals without meaningful access to relief that residents of all 50 states take for granted.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that Congress holds plenary authority over the District of Columbia under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, and that the President's clemency power under Article II extends to DC offenses as a deliberate structural feature — not an oversight. They contend that transferring this power to DC's local government without a constitutional amendment raises serious legal questions about whether Congress can delegate or reassign a presidential power that is textually vested in the executive, and that federal oversight of DC's criminal justice system serves a legitimate accountability function given DC's unique constitutional status.
Constitutional context
The President's pardon power under Article II, Section 2 extends to "offenses against the United States," and courts have held this includes DC criminal offenses given Congress's plenary authority over DC under Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 (the District Clause). The core constitutional question is whether Congress can legislatively reassign or delegate this clemency authority to DC's local government, or whether doing so would impermissibly encroach on a power textually vested in the President.
Checks and balances
DC's local legislative and executive branches would gain clemency authority; Congress retains ultimate oversight of DC under the District Clause and could override DC legislation, but the President would lose direct clemency power over DC criminal offenses.
Historical precedent
The DC Home Rule Act of 1973 transferred significant legislative and executive authority to DC's local government, but did not address clemency power, which has remained with the President for DC criminal offenses.