HR-6028-119
Received in the Senate.
Sponsored by H. Griffith (R-VA)
What it does
This bill would shift the appointment of the Librarian of Congress and the Director of the Government Publishing Office (GPO) from the President (with Senate confirmation) to a bipartisan congressional commission. It would restrict removal of those officials to a majority vote of House and Senate majority and minority leaders. The bill would also move the Register of Copyrights out from under the Library of Congress's supervision, making the Register a presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed position with a 10-year term limit. Additionally, it would require GPO to establish a formal human capital management system.
Who benefits
Congress as an institution, which would gain direct control over two major legislative branch agencies. Minority party leaders in both chambers, who would gain a formal role in both appointment and removal decisions. Copyright industry stakeholders (publishers, authors, musicians, software developers, film studios) who may prefer a more independent Copyright Office with direct presidential accountability. GPO employees, who may benefit from a structured human capital management system. Bipartisan governance advocates who favor insulating legislative branch agencies from executive influence.
Who is hurt
The executive branch, which would lose appointment authority over the Librarian of Congress and GPO Director. The sitting President, who would lose a patronage and policy lever over two agencies. Researchers, academics, and the public who rely on the Library of Congress, if the new commission-based appointment process produces slower or more contentious leadership transitions. Copyright Office staff and stakeholders who may face disruption during the structural separation from the Library of Congress. Taxpayers who may bear transition and implementation costs for the reorganization and the new GPO human capital system.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that the Librarian of Congress and GPO Director serve the legislative branch and should be accountable to Congress, not the President — making the current presidential appointment model a structural mismatch. They contend that a bipartisan commission insulates these positions from partisan political cycles, protecting the institutional integrity of agencies that manage the nation's legislative records, public printing, and copyright system. Regarding the Copyright Office specifically, supporters argue that separating it from the Library of Congress and giving it a presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed leader would elevate its independence and credibility in an era of high-stakes copyright policy affecting the digital economy.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that shifting appointment power to a congressional commission creates a novel structure that blurs the separation of powers — Congress would effectively be appointing officers who exercise executive-style administrative functions, potentially conflicting with the Appointments Clause (Art. II, §2, cl. 2), which reserves appointment of principal officers to the President. They contend that the removal restriction — requiring agreement from four congressional leaders — could make it nearly impossible to remove underperforming officials, reducing accountability rather than strengthening it. Critics may also argue that separating the Copyright Office from the Library of Congress fragments a historically integrated institution without clear evidence that the current structure has produced policy failures.
Constitutional context
The Appointments Clause (Art. II, §2, cl. 2) requires that principal officers be appointed by the President with Senate confirmation, while Congress may vest appointment of inferior officers in the President alone, courts, or heads of departments. Shifting appointment of the Librarian of Congress and GPO Director to a congressional commission raises the question of whether Congress may appoint its own officers — a structure the Supreme Court addressed in Buckley v. Valeo (1976), which held that Congress cannot appoint officers exercising executive functions. Whether these positions are "principal" or "inferior" officers, and whether they exercise executive functions, would be central to any constitutional challenge.
Checks and balances
Congress gains direct appointment and removal authority over the Librarian of Congress and GPO Director; the executive branch loses those appointment powers, though the Register of Copyrights would shift to presidential appointment with Senate confirmation, partially offsetting that change.
Historical precedent
Buckley v. Valeo (1976) struck down a Federal Election Commission appointment structure in which Congress appointed officers exercising executive functions, establishing that such arrangements violate the Appointments Clause — the most directly analogous precedent for the commission-based appointment mechanism in this bill.