HR-6544-119
Placed on the Union Calendar, Calendar No. 452.
Sponsored by William Timmons (R-SC)
What it does
This bill would shorten the required cycle for regulatory reviews by federal financial agencies from every 10 years to every 7 years. It would also expand the scope of those reviews to include an assessment of the cumulative impact of regulations on access to financial products and services, credit availability, market liquidity, and the costs and benefits of regulations relative to financial safety and overall economic activity. Additionally, it would formally include the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) in the review process, codifying a practice that was previously not explicitly required by statute.
Who benefits
Insured depository institutions (banks, credit unions, savings associations) that may see outdated or burdensome regulations identified and removed more frequently. Credit union members, as the NCUA's formal inclusion may prompt more systematic review of rules affecting that sector. Small and community banks that may disproportionately bear the cumulative compliance costs of layered regulations. Borrowers and consumers who could benefit if reviews lead to reduced regulatory barriers to credit access or financial product availability. Researchers and policymakers who would gain more frequent, structured data on regulatory impacts.
Who is hurt
Consumer advocacy groups and regulators who argue that more frequent reviews could create pressure to weaken financial protections. Federal financial agency staff who would bear increased administrative workload from more frequent and broader review cycles. Taxpayers who may indirectly fund the expanded review process. Competitors of insured depository institutions — such as non-bank financial firms — who are not subject to the same review process and may face a relative disadvantage if bank regulations are eased. Communities that rely on consumer financial protections that could be identified as candidates for rollback.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that the current 10-year review cycle is too infrequent to keep pace with a rapidly evolving financial sector, and that outdated regulations impose real costs on banks and credit unions that are ultimately passed on to consumers through higher fees and reduced credit access. They contend that requiring agencies to assess the cumulative burden of regulations — not just individual rules in isolation — addresses a well-documented gap, as studies by the Bank for International Settlements and others have found that layered regulatory requirements can have compounding effects on lending capacity that no single-rule review would capture.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that shortening the review cycle and broadening its scope creates a structural mechanism for systematically weakening financial regulations that were put in place after the 2008 financial crisis to protect consumers and ensure systemic stability. They contend that framing reviews around "costs and benefits" and "economic activity" tilts the analytical lens toward deregulation, and that more frequent reviews could divert agency resources away from supervision and enforcement — the functions most directly tied to preventing financial harm — toward paperwork exercises that benefit well-resourced industry lobbying efforts.
Constitutional context
This bill operates squarely within Congress's Commerce Clause authority (Art. I, §8, cl. 3) to regulate financial institutions engaged in interstate commerce, an area with well-established federal jurisdiction. The bill directs existing agencies to conduct reviews rather than delegating broad new rulemaking power, so nondelegation concerns under Art. I, §1 are minimal. No clear active constitutional tension is implicated.
Checks and balances
Congress gains modest oversight leverage by mandating more frequent and broader agency reviews; the executive branch financial agencies (OCC, FDIC, Federal Reserve, NCUA, etc.) retain discretion over review findings and any resulting rulemaking, subject to post-Loper Bright independent judicial review of any rule changes that follow.
Historical precedent
The Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act of 1996 (EGRPRA) established the original 10-year regulatory review requirement for federal banking agencies that this bill would modify.