HR-6856-119
Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on the Judiciary, Financial Services, Ways and Means, Oversight and Government Reform, Energy and Commerce, and Rules, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
Sponsored by Brian Fitzpatrick (R-PA)
What it does
This bill would impose a sweeping package of economic sanctions, trade restrictions, and investment prohibitions on the Russian Federation if Russia refuses to negotiate a peace agreement with Ukraine, violates such an agreement, or launches another military invasion of Ukraine. It would block the assets of named Russian officials and financial institutions, ban U.S. persons from investing in or trading with Russia, prohibit Russian entities from listing on U.S. securities exchanges, impose tariffs of up to 500% on Russian imports, ban uranium imports from Russia, close a loophole allowing refined products made from Russian crude oil to enter the U.S., and sanction individuals involved in Russia-North Korea military cooperation and the forced deportation of Ukrainian children. It would also repeal the sunset provision of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, making those sanctions permanent.
Who benefits
Ukraine and its government, which would gain stronger U.S. economic leverage on its behalf. U.S. and allied uranium producers and energy companies that compete with Russian suppliers. U.S. domestic manufacturers and energy producers who would face less Russian competition. Allied nations (EU, UK, G7) whose existing sanctions regimes would be reinforced and coordinated with U.S. law. Human rights advocates and Ukrainian civilians, particularly families of deported children. U.S. defense contractors who may see increased demand for allied military support. Non-Russian maritime insurers who would gain business as Russian-linked insurers are excluded. Domestic nuclear fuel producers who would benefit from reduced Russian uranium competition.
Who is hurt
U.S. businesses with existing operations or investments in Russia that would face a 270-day wind-down period and then full prohibition. U.S. nuclear power plant operators who rely on Russian-sourced uranium and may face supply disruptions or higher costs. American consumers and industries that use energy products, as broader supply restrictions could affect global energy prices. Third-country companies and financial institutions (e.g., in India, China, Turkey) that transact with Russia and could face secondary sanctions. International financial messaging services (e.g., SWIFT-like entities) that could be sanctioned for serving Russian banks. Foreign port operators who allow sanctioned Russian-linked vessels to dock. Russian citizens broadly, through economic isolation. U.S. aerospace and NASA contractors who depend on Russian space launch services, though a specific exception is carved out.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that the bill provides Congress with a credible, codified deterrent against Russian aggression that does not depend solely on executive discretion — a gap that has allowed sanctions to be weakened or waived without legislative input. They contend that Russia's ongoing war in Ukraine, including documented forced deportation of Ukrainian children (recognized by the International Criminal Court), the deployment of North Korean troops, and attacks on civilian infrastructure, demands a comprehensive legislative response. Supporters further argue that locking in sanctions through statute, rather than executive order, sends a stronger signal to Moscow and to U.S. allies that American policy is durable and bipartisan.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that the bill significantly constrains the President's constitutional authority to conduct foreign policy and negotiate diplomatic solutions, potentially removing the executive flexibility needed to reach or enforce a peace deal — the very outcome the bill claims to seek. They contend that mandatory, congressionally-directed sanctions with limited waiver authority could undermine ongoing diplomatic efforts, alienate third-party mediators, and trigger retaliatory measures that harm U.S. energy markets and nuclear supply chains. Opponents further argue that secondary sanctions on foreign financial institutions and port operators risk straining relationships with key allies and neutral countries whose cooperation is essential to any durable resolution of the conflict.