HR-7120-119
Referred to the House Committee on Ways and Means.
Sponsored by Austin Scott (R-GA)
What it does
This bill would amend Title II of the Social Security Act to allow Purple Heart recipients receiving Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) — when their disability is directly attributable to the injury that earned them the Purple Heart — to continue receiving benefits even after their "termination month" (the point at which earnings would normally end benefits). Instead of losing benefits entirely when they exceed the Substantial Gainful Activity (SGA) threshold, their benefit would be gradually reduced by $1 for every $4 earned above that threshold. The bill would also apply the higher SGA earnings threshold (currently used only for blind individuals) to this group, allowing them to earn more before any reduction begins.
Who benefits
Purple Heart recipients who are on SSDI due to combat-related injuries and who are able to return to some level of paid work. Family members who receive auxiliary SSDI benefits based on the disabled veteran's record would also see proportional benefit protection. Employers who hire disabled veterans may benefit from a larger pool of work-ready candidates. Veterans' service organizations that advocate for wounded warrior employment would see a policy goal advanced.
Who is hurt
The Social Security trust fund would face reduced revenue or increased outlays, which could indirectly affect all current and future SSDI beneficiaries if the fund's solvency is affected. Workers who paid into SSDI but are not Purple Heart recipients — including non-combat disabled veterans and civilians — receive no equivalent work incentive, creating a tiered benefit structure. Taxpayers broadly bear any increased program costs.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that Purple Heart recipients sustained their disabilities in direct service to the country and face unique barriers to re-entering the workforce under the current "all-or-nothing" SSDI cliff, where exceeding the SGA threshold eliminates benefits entirely. They contend that a gradual offset — identical in structure to the earned income phase-out used in other federal programs — removes a documented disincentive to work, potentially reducing long-term program dependency and honoring the sacrifices of combat-wounded veterans with a targeted, earned benefit.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that singling out one class of SSDI recipients for preferential work incentives creates an inequitable two-tiered system, since civilians and non-combat veterans with equally severe disabilities face the same work disincentive cliff with no relief. They contend that if the gradual offset model is sound policy, it should apply to all SSDI recipients — and that limiting it to Purple Heart holders sets a precedent of using military honor distinctions to allocate social insurance benefits, which were designed to be need- and contribution-based, not merit-based.
Constitutional context
Congress has broad authority to structure Social Security benefit programs under the Taxing and Spending Clause (Art. I, §8, cl. 1), and the Supreme Court has long held that benefit classifications need only satisfy rational basis review. No active constitutional tension is implicated here — this is a targeted modification of an existing statutory benefit formula.
Checks and balances
Congress gains authority to define a new benefit subclass; the Social Security Administration implements the offset formula administratively; beneficiaries may appeal determinations through SSA's existing administrative and judicial review process.
Historical precedent
The Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999 similarly attempted to reduce SSDI work disincentives by extending Medicare coverage and creating trial work periods, though it applied broadly to all SSDI recipients rather than a specific subgroup.