HR-7638-119
Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, and in addition to the Committees on Energy and Commerce, Ways and Means, and Financial Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
Sponsored by Tim Walberg (R-MI)
What it does
This bill would make it harder for the federal government to seize and keep private property connected to alleged crimes. It would shorten the notice period after a seizure from 60 days to 7 days, require the government to meet a higher standard of proof to keep seized property, provide free legal representation to low-income property owners, and expand the factors courts must weigh when deciding if a forfeiture is constitutionally excessive. It would also eliminate "equitable sharing" — the practice of sharing forfeited assets with state and local law enforcement — and redirect all forfeiture proceeds to the general Treasury fund instead of the DOJ's dedicated forfeiture fund.
Who benefits
Property owners whose assets are seized — particularly low-income individuals who currently cannot afford legal representation to contest a forfeiture. Small business owners and cash-intensive businesses (e.g., restaurants, convenience stores) who are disproportionately targeted in structuring-related seizures. Individuals charged with or suspected of minor offenses who face disproportionate property loss. State and local taxpayers who may benefit from forfeiture proceeds flowing to the general Treasury rather than funding law enforcement budgets. Civil liberties advocates who have long sought higher procedural protections in forfeiture cases.
Who is hurt
Federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies that currently rely on equitable sharing revenue to fund equipment, training, and operations — the DOJ equitable sharing program distributed over $400 million to agencies in recent years. The DOJ Assets Forfeiture Fund, which funds federal law enforcement programs, would lose its dedicated revenue stream. Prosecutors who use forfeiture as a tool to disrupt criminal enterprises may face a higher evidentiary burden that makes some cases harder to pursue. Victims of crime who sometimes receive restitution from forfeiture funds could see reduced payouts if the fund is redirected.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that civil asset forfeiture allows the government to permanently take property from people who are never charged with — let alone convicted of — a crime, violating basic due process principles. They point to documented cases, including an Institute for Justice study finding that the majority of federal forfeitures go uncontested not because owners lack a claim, but because legal costs exceed the value of the seized property. They contend that equitable sharing creates a perverse financial incentive for law enforcement to seize property to fund their own budgets, and that redirecting proceeds to the general Treasury removes that conflict of interest while higher evidentiary standards ensure only genuinely crime-connected property is forfeited.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that civil asset forfeiture is an essential tool for dismantling large-scale criminal enterprises — particularly drug trafficking and money laundering operations — by cutting off their financial resources before a conviction is secured. They contend that the existing evidentiary standard already requires a connection between property and criminal activity, and that raising it further would allow criminals to retain proceeds of crime during lengthy prosecutions. They argue that eliminating equitable sharing would defund state and local law enforcement programs that depend on those resources, and that the 7-day notification requirement is operationally unworkable in complex multi-defendant investigations where premature disclosure could compromise ongoing cases.
Constitutional context
The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause are directly implicated. In Timbs v. Indiana (2019), the Supreme Court incorporated the Excessive Fines Clause against the states, signaling heightened judicial scrutiny of disproportionate forfeitures. The bill's expansion of factors courts must consider in excessive-forfeiture determinations directly responds to Timbs. The Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination and due process protections are also relevant to the bill's higher evidentiary standards and right-to-counsel provisions.
Checks and balances
The judicial branch gains authority under this bill, as expanded Eighth Amendment proportionality review and higher evidentiary standards give courts more grounds to block or reverse forfeitures; the executive branch (DOJ and law enforcement agencies) loses discretionary power over seized assets and their distribution.
Historical precedent
The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 previously raised the federal evidentiary standard from probable cause to a preponderance of the evidence and shifted the burden of proof to the government, establishing a direct legislative precedent for the procedural changes this bill would extend further.