HR-766-119
Referred to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce.
Sponsored by Robert Garcia (D-CA)
What it does
The bill would require the HHS Secretary, acting through the CDC and in coordination with federal, state, and local agencies, to expand, intensify, and coordinate the National Wastewater Surveillance System to detect and monitor pathogens such as SARS-CoV-2, influenza, mpox, dengue, West Nile virus, and RSV. It would authorize $150 million per year for fiscal years 2026 through 2030, available until spent. It would not require any wastewater utility or service provider to comply with a surveillance request.
Who benefits
State, local, tribal, and territorial health departments that may gain support for testing and data work. Public health officials and hospitals that could get earlier signals of disease spread. Residents of communities where outbreaks might be detected sooner, including people who are not tested individually. Laboratories and wastewater utilities that choose to take part and may gain funding or technical help.
Who is hurt
Federal taxpayers, since the bill would authorize up to $750 million over five years, though actual spending depends on later appropriations. Other public health programs that might compete for the same limited funds. Utilities that choose to take part may face added sampling and reporting work. Residents who worry about community-level health data collection may have privacy concerns, though the system tests aggregate wastewater.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that wastewater monitoring captures infections from people who never get tested or show symptoms, and can give health officials earlier warning than clinical reports. They contend that a stable five-year authorization would let the CDC expand coverage across many pathogens, and that the voluntary utility provision protects local operators while building a national early-warning network.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that $750 million over five years is a significant commitment when the system's effect on health outcomes is still unproven, and that existing programs may already cover much of this work. They contend that voluntary participation could leave coverage uneven, and that the bill gives the CDC broad discretion to expand surveillance to many pathogens without clear performance limits.
Constitutional context
Congress would act under the Spending Clause (Art. I, §8, cl. 1) and the Necessary and Proper Clause to fund public health surveillance. Because participation is voluntary and no state conditions are imposed, the coercion concern from NFIB v. Sebelius (2012) would not appear to arise.
Checks and balances
The executive branch (HHS/CDC) gains program-expansion authority, while Congress keeps control through the authorization and later appropriations, and utilities and states keep the ability to decline participation.
Historical precedent
The CDC launched the National Wastewater Surveillance System in 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic, and Congress has funded public health surveillance through prior pandemic-preparedness laws such as the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act.