HR-7816-119
Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, and in addition to the Committee on Intelligence (Permanent Select), for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
Sponsored by Andy Biggs (R-AZ)
What it does
This bill would make two major changes to federal surveillance law. First, it would amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) to require a court order or warrant before intelligence and law enforcement agencies can search databases of communications collected under Section 702 for information about U.S. persons, with narrow exceptions for emergencies, consent, and cybersecurity threats. Second, it would prohibit federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies from purchasing records about U.S. persons from commercial data brokers — including location data, web browsing history, and communications records — without a court order, and would bar such purchased data from being used as evidence in any proceeding.
Who benefits
All U.S. persons whose communications, location data, or browsing history are currently accessible to government agencies without a warrant — potentially hundreds of millions of people. Journalists, political activists, religious organizations, and political candidates who are specifically named as "sensitive investigative matters" warranting heightened FISA court scrutiny. Civil liberties organizations that have long sought judicial oversight of Section 702 queries. Technology companies and internet service providers who would gain clearer legal boundaries on what they must disclose. Data broker industry competitors who do not sell to government agencies. Defendants in criminal cases who could challenge evidence derived from warrantless data purchases.
Who is hurt
Federal intelligence and law enforcement agencies — including the FBI, NSA, and CIA — that currently use warrantless "backdoor searches" of Section 702 databases and purchase commercially available data as investigative tools. Data brokers and aggregators whose government contracts would be eliminated or sharply curtailed. Prosecutors who rely on commercially purchased location or communications data in criminal cases, who could lose access to that evidence. National security officials who argue that speed and flexibility in querying collected intelligence is operationally critical. Counterterrorism and counterintelligence units that use data broker records to track foreign-linked threats operating inside the U.S.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that the government has exploited a loophole allowing it to buy from data brokers what it cannot legally compel through a warrant, effectively circumventing the Fourth Amendment's protections for hundreds of millions of Americans. They point to documented FBI abuses of Section 702 backdoor searches — including the FISA Court's own findings of hundreds of thousands of improper queries — as evidence that the current system lacks adequate safeguards. They further contend that requiring a warrant does not prevent legitimate surveillance; it simply ensures judicial oversight before Americans' private communications and location histories are searched.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that the warrant requirement for Section 702 queries would cripple time-sensitive counterterrorism and counterintelligence operations, since Section 702 data is collected targeting foreign adversaries and U.S. person information appears incidentally — not as the primary target. They contend that commercially purchased data is already voluntarily shared by consumers with private companies, placing it outside traditional Fourth Amendment protections under the third-party doctrine, and that eliminating this tool would create blind spots in tracking foreign-linked threats. They also argue the bill's broad evidentiary exclusion rule could result in dismissal of serious criminal cases on technical grounds unrelated to actual misconduct.
Constitutional context
The bill directly engages the Fourth Amendment's protections against unreasonable searches and the unresolved question — highlighted in Carpenter v. United States (2018) — of whether the government needs a warrant to obtain comprehensive digital records, including location data and communications metadata, from third parties. The Carpenter decision cast doubt on the traditional third-party doctrine as applied to digital data, but left many questions open; this bill would resolve those questions legislatively in favor of a warrant requirement. The bill also implicates the Declare War and Commander-in-Chief Clauses, as restricting intelligence collection tools touches the boundary between congressional oversight authority and executive national security prerogatives.
Checks and balances
The executive branch (intelligence and law enforcement agencies) loses unilateral authority to query Section 702 databases for U.S. person data and to purchase records from data brokers; the judicial branch gains oversight through mandatory warrant or court-order requirements, and Congress gains enhanced oversight through new reporting mandates and expanded FISA Court amicus curiae participation.
Historical precedent
The USA FREEDOM Act of 2015 similarly restricted bulk telephone metadata collection under Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act following the Snowden disclosures, establishing a precedent for Congress legislatively curtailing warrantless surveillance programs after documented abuses.