HR-7836-119
Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, and in addition to the Committee on the Budget, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
Sponsored by Zoe Lofgren (D-CA)
What it does
This bill would establish a new, independent system of immigration courts under Article I of the Constitution, removing immigration adjudication from the executive branch entirely. It would create a three-division court system — a trial division, an appellate division (with 21 presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed judges serving 15-year terms), and an administrative division — to replace the current immigration courts housed within the Department of Justice. Immigration trial judges would be appointed by the appellate division rather than the executive branch, and judges could only be removed for cause.
Who benefits
Immigrants and asylum seekers in removal proceedings, who would gain access to judges insulated from executive branch pressure and political direction. Immigration attorneys and legal advocates, who would practice before a court with clearer procedural rules and published precedents. Respondents in immigration proceedings who are detained, who would have bond and custody determinations made by independent judges. Legal services nonprofits, which would be formally integrated into a court-maintained legal orientation program. Individuals with asylum or VAWA-related claims, whose records would receive confidentiality protections. Taxpayers and the public, to the extent that a more efficient, independent court reduces backlogs and costly appeals to federal circuit courts.
Who is hurt
The executive branch — specifically the President and the Department of Justice — would lose direct control over immigration adjudication, including the current ability to set enforcement priorities through immigration judge hiring, firing, and policy directives. The Department of Homeland Security, which currently shapes immigration court outcomes through prosecutorial discretion and policy guidance binding on judges, would lose that lever. Immigration judges currently employed as executive branch attorneys would face a transition to a new employment structure. The federal budget would bear new costs for an independent court system, including judge salaries benchmarked to federal district court pay, retirement benefits, court facilities, and administrative infrastructure. States and localities that rely on current executive-branch immigration enforcement coordination could face disruption during the transition period.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that the current immigration court system — where judges are employees of the Attorney General who can be hired, fired, and directed by the executive branch — creates a structural conflict of interest that undermines due process. They point to the immigration court backlog, which exceeded 3.7 million cases as of 2024, and argue that executive interference with docket management and judge performance metrics has contributed to inconsistent outcomes. They contend that Article I courts modeled on the Tax Court and the Court of International Trade would provide the judicial independence necessary for fair, efficient adjudication, and that insulating judges from political pressure would produce more consistent, legally sound decisions that reduce costly federal circuit court appeals.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that immigration enforcement is a core executive power rooted in the President's constitutional authority over foreign affairs and national security, and that removing adjudication from the executive branch would impair the President's ability to implement immigration policy. They contend that creating a fully independent Article I court adds a new layer of federal bureaucracy with significant, unquantified costs at a time of fiscal pressure, without a demonstrated causal link between court independence and reduced backlogs. They further argue that the bill's 15-year judicial terms and cause-only removal standard could entrench a particular ideological approach to immigration law for decades, reducing democratic accountability over a policy area where public preferences shift significantly across election cycles.
Constitutional context
The Naturalization Clause (Art. I, §8, cl. 4) grants Congress broad authority to establish rules for immigration, and Congress has long used that power to create adjudicative bodies. Article I courts — legislative courts established by Congress rather than under Article III — are a recognized constitutional form, as seen in the Tax Court and the Court of International Trade. The key tension here involves the Take Care Clause (Art. II, §1 and §3), which vests executive power in the President: removing immigration adjudication from executive control raises questions about whether the President retains sufficient supervisory authority. Post-Loper Bright (2024), courts will independently assess the statutory framework rather than deferring to agency interpretations of the new court's jurisdiction and procedures.
Checks and balances
The executive branch loses direct control over immigration adjudication; the appellate division gains authority to appoint and remove trial judges, while the President retains the power to appoint and remove appellate judges, and Congress retains oversight through mandatory reporting requirements and the ability to terminate temporary court expansions by concurrent resolution.
Historical precedent
Congress has previously established Article I legislative courts with adjudicative independence in specialized domains, most directly the U.S. Tax Court (26 U.S.C. §7441) and the Court of International Trade, though neither involved the transfer of a function previously exercised within a cabinet department at this scale.