HR-8035-119
Rule H. Res. 1175 failed passage of House.
Sponsored by Eric Crawford (R-AR)
What it does
This bill would extend the surveillance authorities under Title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) — most notably Section 702 — through October 20, 2027. Section 702 allows U.S. intelligence agencies to collect communications of non-U.S. persons believed to be located outside the United States without an individual warrant, though communications involving U.S. persons may be incidentally collected and, under certain conditions, searched. The bill would also extend transition procedures ensuring that any active surveillance orders remain in effect until their individual expiration dates if Title VII were to lapse.
Who benefits
U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies (NSA, FBI, CIA) that rely on Section 702 collection for counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and cybersecurity operations. The broader U.S. public and allied governments that benefit from foreign intelligence gathered under these authorities. Defense contractors and critical infrastructure operators who receive threat intelligence derived from Section 702 collection. Congressional oversight committees that retain access to intelligence products generated under the program.
Who is hurt
U.S. persons whose communications are incidentally collected when they contact foreign targets — they have no individual notice or warrant protection under this program. Civil liberties and privacy advocacy organizations that have sought stricter limits on warrantless querying of U.S. person data. Foreign nationals outside the U.S. who are subject to surveillance under these authorities. Journalists, lawyers, and activists who communicate internationally and may be more likely to have communications swept up incidentally. Technology and telecommunications companies that bear compliance costs and reputational risk from association with government surveillance programs.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that Section 702 is one of the most valuable foreign intelligence tools available to the U.S. government, with the Intelligence Community crediting it with disrupting terrorist plots, identifying foreign cyber intrusions, and tracking weapons proliferation networks. They contend that the program targets only non-U.S. persons abroad, that existing minimization procedures and FISA Court oversight provide meaningful safeguards, and that allowing the authority to lapse — even temporarily — would create dangerous gaps in national security coverage that adversaries could exploit.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that Section 702 functions as a de facto warrantless surveillance program for Americans, because the FBI and other agencies can query the incidentally collected database of U.S. person communications without obtaining a warrant — a practice critics call the "backdoor search loophole." They contend that documented compliance violations, including thousands of improper FBI queries identified by the FISA Court, demonstrate that existing oversight is insufficient, and that a clean reauthorization without stronger warrant requirements for U.S. person queries fails to address the program's core civil liberties problems.
Constitutional context
The Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures is the central constitutional issue. In Carpenter v. United States (2018), the Supreme Court signaled heightened scrutiny for government collection of comprehensive digital records, leaving open questions about whether warrantless querying of incidentally collected U.S. person communications satisfies constitutional requirements. The Suspension Clause (Art. I, §9, cl. 2) and Fifth Amendment Due Process are also implicated by the lack of individual notice or meaningful opportunity to challenge collection.
Checks and balances
The Executive Branch (NSA, FBI, CIA) gains continued authority to conduct surveillance; checks include FISA Court oversight of targeting and minimization procedures, congressional intelligence committee review, and the statutory requirement that targets be non-U.S. persons located abroad.
Historical precedent
Section 702 was originally enacted as part of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 and has been reauthorized multiple times, most recently through the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act of 2024, which added some limits on FBI querying of U.S. person data but preserved the core warrantless collection framework.