HR-831-119
Received in the Senate.
Sponsored by Ken Calvert (R-CA)
What it does
This bill would amend the Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009 to establish a dedicated, interest-bearing Treasury account — called the Non-Federal Funding Account for the Lower Colorado River Multi-Species Conservation Program — to hold state contributions to that program. The Secretary of the Treasury would be authorized to invest idle fund balances in U.S. government securities, with interest earned added to the fund. Previously contributed but unspent state funds would be transferred into the new account within 90 days of enactment, and state parties would be shielded from liability for any investment losses.
Who benefits
State governments along the Lower Colorado River (Arizona, California, Nevada) that contribute non-federal cost-share funds, as their contributions would now earn interest rather than sitting idle. The Lower Colorado River Multi-Species Conservation Program itself, which would have a larger pool of funds available over time due to interest accrual. Federally listed threatened and endangered species whose habitat the program protects. Water utilities, municipalities, and agricultural water users in the region who depend on the program's Endangered Species Act compliance to continue water diversions. The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, which administers the program.
Who is hurt
The U.S. Treasury's general fund would forgo interest on the transferred funds, as those amounts would now accrue to the dedicated account rather than the general fund. Taxpayers broadly bear a marginal, indirect cost from this reallocation. Competing conservation programs not structured with similar accounts may be at a relative disadvantage in fund management efficiency.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that state governments contributing millions of dollars in non-federal cost-share funds under the 2005 Funding and Management Agreement have had no mechanism to earn a return on those contributions while they await expenditure — effectively losing value to inflation. They contend that establishing an interest-bearing account is sound fiscal stewardship that stretches conservation dollars further, at no new cost to federal taxpayers, and that the interest earned would directly support habitat protection for endangered species along the Colorado River.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that creating a dedicated Treasury account outside the normal appropriations process reduces congressional oversight over how funds are spent, since principal deposits are made available "without further appropriation." They contend that even modest structural changes to fund management set a precedent for bypassing annual appropriations review, and that the program's effectiveness and accountability would be better served by keeping funds subject to standard congressional oversight mechanisms rather than a self-replenishing account.
Constitutional context
The Appropriations Clause (Art. I, §9, cl. 7) requires that funds be drawn from the Treasury only pursuant to appropriations made by law. This bill creates a limited exception by making principal deposits available "without further appropriation," a structure Congress has used in other dedicated fund statutes. No major constitutional tension is present, as Congress is explicitly authorizing the fund structure itself.
Checks and balances
The executive branch (Secretary of the Treasury and Secretary of the Interior) gains administrative authority over the new fund, but Congress retains oversight through the requirement that interest earnings remain subject to appropriation, and expenditures must conform to existing Program Documents.
Historical precedent
Congress has previously established similar dedicated interest-bearing Treasury accounts for other multi-party conservation cost-share programs, including accounts under the Federal Land Transaction Facilitation Act and various reclamation project funding structures.