Passed
240 Yea181 Nay10 Not voting1/2 required
HR-8312-119
Motion to reconsider laid on the table Agreed to without objection.
Sponsored by Pete Sessions (R-TX)
What it does
This bill would restructure the Treasury Department's Bureau of the Fiscal Service to run a governmentwide data analysis program for detecting fraud and improper payments, and would create a new permanent Senate-confirmed Inspector General for Fraud, Accountability, and Recovery within Treasury, effective December 31, 2028. It would transfer the assets, staff, and functions of the pandemic-era Pandemic Response Accountability Committee (PRAC) to this new office, expand data-sharing authorities between Treasury, federal agencies, states, and private entities, and require OMB to issue guidance on using fraud-detection data analytics for programs receiving large supplemental appropriations.
Who benefits
Federal agencies and state/local governments administering federal programs, who would gain new fraud-detection tools and data-sharing services; taxpayers broadly, if fraud and improper payments decline; former PRAC employees, whose positions and terms would be preserved in the new office; financial institutions partnering with the new data-sharing program; and oversight-focused congressional committees that would receive expanded reporting.
Who is hurt
Recipients of federal funds (individuals, businesses, and sub-awardees) who would face increased data screening, verification requirements, and potential delays or denials of payments based on fraud-database matches; entities and individuals whose personal or financial data is shared across agencies and with private partners, raising privacy concerns; state and local governments that must build new coordination capacity; and federal agencies that may bear compliance costs implementing new data-sharing and reporting mandates.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that pandemic-era relief programs lost tens of billions of dollars to fraud because oversight bodies like PRAC were temporary and lacked permanent authority, and that a standing Inspector General with subpoena-like data access would create durable, professional fraud detection across large federal spending programs. They contend the bill's advance data-sharing agreements and screening tools would catch fraudulent actors before payments go out rather than after money is lost, citing GAO estimates of tens of billions in improper payments annually across federal programs.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that consolidating bulk, real-time data on individuals and payees across dozens of federal, state, and private-sector sources creates significant privacy risks with insufficient statutory safeguards, especially given the office's broad law-enforcement classification under records-disclosure statutes. They contend the bill authorizes only $10 million annually starting in 2035 while creating expansive new authorities immediately, and that permanently expanding a temporary pandemic-oversight structure into a governmentwide surveillance-style data system exceeds what is needed to address any specific, demonstrated fraud problem.
Passed