HR-8368-119
Referred to the Committee on Appropriations, and in addition to the Committee on the Budget, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
Sponsored by Troy Carter (D-LA)
What it does
This bill would appropriate $26.367 billion in emergency supplemental funding to FEMA's Disaster Relief Fund for fiscal year 2026. The money would be used to cover costs of major disasters declared under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. The bill designates the funds as an emergency requirement, which exempts them from standard pay-as-you-go budget rules.
Who benefits
Individuals and households in federally declared disaster areas who receive FEMA assistance for housing, property repair, and recovery. State and local governments that receive federal reimbursements for disaster response costs. First responders and emergency management agencies whose operations are partially funded through the DRF. Contractors and businesses hired for disaster recovery and rebuilding work. Nonprofit organizations that partner with FEMA on disaster relief. Communities in disaster-prone regions — particularly those in hurricane, wildfire, flood, and tornado corridors — that depend on federal backstop funding when local resources are exhausted.
Who is hurt
Taxpayers broadly, who bear the cost of the appropriation. Fiscal hawks and budget-conscious lawmakers who oppose emergency designations that bypass pay-as-you-go rules, as the emergency designation adds to the federal deficit without an offset. Future Congresses, which may face reduced fiscal flexibility if emergency supplemental spending becomes a recurring mechanism. Communities that have not experienced a presidentially declared major disaster and receive no direct benefit while sharing the cost.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that FEMA's Disaster Relief Fund is a critical lifeline for Americans who have lost homes, businesses, and livelihoods to catastrophic events, and that underfunding it forces the agency to implement "immediate needs funding" protocols that delay aid to survivors. They contend that the emergency designation is appropriate because disaster costs are by definition unpredictable and cannot be fully pre-funded in annual appropriations, and that the $26.4 billion figure reflects real, accumulated demand from declared major disasters.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that designating $26.4 billion as an emergency bypasses the normal budget process and adds directly to the federal deficit without any offsetting cuts or revenue, a practice they contend has become a routine workaround rather than a genuine response to unforeseen events. They argue that Congress should instead fund disaster relief through the regular appropriations process with offsets, or establish a pre-funded catastrophe reserve, to impose fiscal discipline and prevent the emergency label from being used to circumvent statutory budget caps.
Constitutional context
The Appropriations Clause (Art. I, §9, cl. 7) vests the power of the purse exclusively in Congress, and this bill is a straightforward exercise of that authority. No significant constitutional tension is present; Congress is acting within its core enumerated power to appropriate funds for an existing federal program.
Checks and balances
Congress gains direct spending authority through this appropriation; the Executive Branch (FEMA/DHS) administers the funds under the Stafford Act, and the Office of Inspector General and Government Accountability Office provide oversight of expenditures.
Historical precedent
Congress has repeatedly passed emergency supplemental appropriations for the FEMA Disaster Relief Fund following major disasters, including after Hurricanes Katrina (2005), Sandy (2012), Harvey/Irma/Maria (2017), and Ian (2022), each using the same emergency designation mechanism to bypass pay-as-you-go requirements.