HR-8470-119
Referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary.
Sponsored by Thomas Massie (R-KY)
What it does
This bill would require federal warrants based on probable cause for most government searches, explicitly including access to data held by third parties like phone companies, internet providers, cloud storage services, and data brokers, even if the third party consents. It creates exceptions for plain-view observations, ID verification during stops, and lawfully public information, but bars warrantless use of facial recognition or license plate readers to track people without informed consent. It also creates a new civil right of action allowing individuals to sue federal employees who violate their Fourth Amendment rights, with discretionary attorney's fees for prevailing plaintiffs.
Who benefits
Individuals whose digital records, location data, or biometric data might otherwise be accessed by federal law enforcement without a warrant; civil liberties advocates; defense attorneys and criminal defendants seeking to suppress evidence obtained without a warrant; privacy-focused technology and telecommunications users generally; plaintiffs' attorneys who would litigate the new civil right of action.
Who is hurt
Federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies (FBI, DEA, DHS, IRS Criminal Investigation) that currently use third-party subpoenas, data broker purchases, or consent-based access to obtain records without warrants; data brokers and third-party companies that may face new restrictions on voluntarily sharing data; individual federal employees who could face personal civil liability for Fourth Amendment violations; prosecutors who may lose evidence obtained through current warrantless methods.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that the government has increasingly exploited the "third-party doctrine" to buy or subpoena Americans' financial, location, and communications data without a warrant, effectively evading Fourth Amendment protections through commercial workarounds. They contend that Carpenter v. United States (2018) already recognized that comprehensive digital records deserve warrant protection, and this bill simply codifies and extends that principle while giving individuals a meaningful remedy through a private right of action rather than relying solely on the exclusionary rule.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that a blanket warrant requirement for all third-party data, including data-broker purchases and voluntarily shared business records, would significantly slow legitimate investigations into terrorism, fraud, and organized crime, particularly in fast-moving cases where these tools provide critical leads. They contend that exposing individual federal employees to personal lawsuits, even with a good-faith exception implied by existing doctrine, could deter aggressive but lawful investigative work and create inconsistent enforcement as courts interpret the broad new definitions of "search" and "data" differently across circuits.
Constitutional context
This bill directly implements and extends the Fourth Amendment's warrant and probable-cause requirements, codifying the reasoning of Carpenter v. United States (2018) that third-party digital records carry a reasonable expectation of privacy despite the traditional third-party doctrine from Smith v. Maryland (1979). The new private right of action parallels 42 U.S.C. §1983 but applies it against federal actors for Fourth Amendment violations specifically.
Checks and balances
Congress would statutorily constrain executive branch surveillance and data-collection authority, shifting power toward the judiciary (which must issue warrants) and toward individuals (who gain standing to sue), while federal agencies lose current administrative flexibility to obtain data through subpoenas or consent.
Historical precedent
Carpenter v. United States (2018) established that warrantless collection of historical cell-site location data violates the Fourth Amendment, and this bill extends similar reasoning across a broader range of third-party data types by statute rather than leaving it to case-by-case judicial interpretation.