HR-8484-119
Referred to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce.
Sponsored by Summer Lee (D-PA)
What it does
This bill would create a new federal grant program letting the Secretary of Health and Human Services give money to public and private nonprofit health care facilities and home health agencies during declared emergencies or disasters. Grant recipients would use the funds to pay eligible frontline health workers up to $13 per hour in hazard pay (capped at $25,000 per worker per year) and to fund safety measures like protective equipment and alternative transportation. The bill authorizes "such sums as may be necessary" but does not appropriate a specific dollar amount.
Who benefits
Frontline health care workers whose jobs cannot be done remotely — including nurses, direct care workers, medical technologists, public health workers, orderlies, and environmental/janitorial staff in health care settings — would receive additional pay and protective resources during emergencies. Health care facilities and home health agencies would gain a funding source to retain staff during crises, and patients could benefit indirectly from better-staffed facilities.
Who is hurt
Federal taxpayers would bear the cost of the open-ended appropriation, which has no specified cap. Health care workers in for-profit facilities or roles the Secretary does not designate as "essential" would not qualify, potentially creating disparities among workers facing similar risks. Facilities that do not apply for or receive grants could face competitive disadvantages in staff retention compared to those that do.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that health care workers took on outsized personal risk during emergencies like the COVID-19 pandemic, often without additional compensation, and that this bill establishes a standing mechanism to reward that risk quickly rather than relying on ad hoc relief packages. They contend that hazard pay and safety funding would help retain essential staff during future public health emergencies, when facilities often face acute understaffing precisely when patient needs peak.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that authorizing "such sums as may be necessary" without a specific cap creates open-ended fiscal exposure that could grow substantially depending on how frequently emergencies are declared and how broadly the Secretary defines "essential health care worker." They contend that discretion given to the Secretary to determine which work is "hazardous" and which roles qualify could lead to inconsistent implementation and administrative disputes over eligibility across states and facility types.
Constitutional context
Congress has authority to create this grant program under the Taxing and Spending Clause (Art. I, §8, cl. 1), and the program operates as a voluntary funding offer to facilities rather than a mandate, avoiding the coercion concerns raised in NFIB v. Sebelius (2012) regarding conditional federal funding.
Checks and balances
Congress authorizes the grant program and defines eligibility broadly in statute, but delegates significant discretion to the HHS Secretary to determine which roles are "essential," which work is "hazardous," and how funds are administered, with oversight limited to appropriations riders and agency reporting requirements.
Historical precedent
Congress provided similar emergency hazard pay and workforce support through COVID-19-era legislation such as the CARES Act and the Provider Relief Fund, which funded health care facilities and workers during the pandemic.