HR-8648-119
Referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
Sponsored by James Baird (R-IN)
What it does
This bill would formally establish within the Department of State a program called FIRST (Foundational Infrastructure for Responsible Use of Small Modular Reactor Technology), managed by the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security. The program would conduct diplomacy to promote U.S. civil nuclear technology and small modular reactors (SMRs) in foreign markets, help partner countries develop licensing and regulatory frameworks, and provide early-stage commercial project support to U.S. businesses competing against state-backed foreign competitors. The program would sunset on June 8, 2034, and would be required to report to Congress within 120 days of enactment and provide briefings on a triannual basis thereafter.
Who benefits
U.S. civil nuclear energy companies and their suppliers seeking foreign contracts. Workers in the U.S. nuclear manufacturing and engineering sectors. Partner countries seeking to build civilian nuclear capacity with high safety and nonproliferation standards. U.S. national security interests, to the extent that U.S.-built reactors displace those built by state-backed competitors (notably Russia's Rosatom and China's CNNC). Congressional oversight committees that would receive structured, regular reporting. Nonproliferation advocates who favor high-standard nuclear deployment globally.
Who is hurt
State-backed foreign nuclear exporters (particularly Russia and China) that currently compete for the same contracts. U.S. taxpayer-funded resources within the State Department's Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs account, which may be redirected toward commercial promotion activities. Countries or projects that do not meet U.S. safety and nonproliferation standards, which may be excluded from program support. Domestic renewable energy companies that compete with nuclear for the same foreign energy market share.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that Russia and China are aggressively expanding their state-subsidized nuclear export programs — Rosatom alone has contracts in over 30 countries — and that the U.S. lacks a coordinated diplomatic infrastructure to compete. They contend that codifying the FIRST program into statute gives it permanence, dedicated oversight, and a clear mandate to level the playing field for U.S. businesses, while simultaneously advancing nonproliferation goals by promoting the highest safety and security standards as conditions of deployment.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that using State Department diplomatic resources and nonproliferation funding to support commercial nuclear sales blurs the line between national security diplomacy and corporate promotion, potentially subordinating arms control priorities to business interests. They contend that SMR technology remains largely unproven at commercial scale — as of 2025, very few SMR designs have received full regulatory approval — raising questions about whether taxpayer-funded diplomacy is being deployed prematurely on behalf of an industry that has not yet demonstrated commercial viability.
Constitutional context
The Foreign Commerce Clause (Art. I, §8, cl. 3) gives Congress broad authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations, which includes promoting U.S. exports through diplomatic programs. The bill operates within the executive branch's foreign affairs apparatus, consistent with the President's broad authority over foreign policy, and does not raise significant separation-of-powers concerns. No active constitutional tension areas are implicated.
Checks and balances
The executive branch (State Department) gains a formally codified program with expanded diplomatic authority to promote U.S. nuclear exports; Congress retains oversight through mandatory reporting within 120 days of enactment, triannual briefings, and a hard sunset date of June 8, 2034.
Historical precedent
The original FIRST program was launched administratively by the State Department in 2020; this bill would codify and expand it into statute, similar to how Congress has previously codified executive trade promotion programs such as those under the Export Enhancement Act of 1988.