HR-8974-119
Referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
Sponsored by Darrell Issa (R-CA)
What it does
This bill would do two things. First, it would remove Venezuela from the list of "countries of concern" under the BUILD Act of 2018, which currently restricts where the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) can operate. Second, it would explicitly authorize the DFC to invest in Venezuela, notwithstanding any other existing legal restrictions. Together, these changes would open Venezuela to U.S. government-backed development financing for the first time under the current statutory framework.
Who benefits
U.S. companies and investors seeking to enter or expand in Venezuela's energy, infrastructure, agriculture, and telecommunications sectors, who could access DFC financing and risk insurance. Venezuelan businesses and workers who could receive capital investment. The Venezuelan population broadly, if investment spurs economic development. U.S. foreign policy interests seeking economic leverage or engagement tools with Venezuela. DFC as an institution, which would gain a new operational theater. Multinational firms already positioned in Venezuela who could benefit from a more normalized U.S. investment environment.
Who is hurt
Venezuelan political dissidents and human rights organizations who argue that increased investment could strengthen the Maduro government's economic position. U.S. sanctions enforcement infrastructure, which could face pressure to align with expanded DFC activity. Competing investors in neighboring markets (e.g., Colombia, Guyana) who benefit from Venezuela's current isolation. U.S. taxpayers who bear risk if DFC investments in a politically unstable country default or are expropriated. Advocacy groups focused on democratic governance in Venezuela, who may view the bill as reducing economic pressure on the current government.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that the DFC's exclusion of Venezuela has ceded economic influence to China and Russia, which have expanded their financial footprint in the country while U.S. firms remain locked out. They contend that targeted development finance — distinct from sanctions relief — can support private-sector growth and civil society without directly benefiting the Venezuelan government, and that engagement through investment is a more effective long-term strategy for promoting stability and democratic conditions than continued isolation.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that authorizing DFC investment in Venezuela while the Maduro government remains in power would provide economic legitimacy and indirect financial benefit to a government the U.S. has formally refused to recognize as democratic. They contend that Venezuela's history of nationalizing foreign assets — including billions in expropriated U.S. company holdings — creates substantial risk of taxpayer-backed losses, and that removing Venezuela from the "countries of concern" list undermines the statutory framework designed to prevent U.S. development finance from flowing to adversarial or high-risk states.
Constitutional context
The Foreign Commerce Clause (Art. I, §8, cl. 3) gives Congress broad authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations, including authorizing or restricting government-backed investment abroad. The bill does not implicate the President's exclusive recognition power under Zivotofsky v. Kerry (2015), as it does not address formal diplomatic recognition of Venezuela — it modifies a statutory investment restriction only.
Checks and balances
Congress gains authority by lifting a statutory restriction it previously imposed; the Executive Branch (through the DFC and the President) retains discretion over whether and how to deploy investment in Venezuela, and existing executive sanctions authorities remain a separate check on the scope of permissible activity.
Historical precedent
The BUILD Act of 2018 created the DFC and its "countries of concern" list as a mechanism to restrict U.S. development finance from flowing to geopolitically sensitive states; this bill would be the first legislative action to remove a country from that list.