HR-8994-119
Referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary.
Sponsored by Deborah Ross (D-NC)
What it does
This bill would create a limited antitrust safe harbor allowing independent music creator-owners — those who own their own copyrights and earn less than $1 million annually in licensing revenue — to collectively negotiate licensing terms with large online music platforms (those earning more than $100 million annually from music distribution) and with generative AI companies. It would also allow these independent creators to collectively refuse to license their music to such platforms. The safe harbor would not apply if negotiations are limited solely to price, are discriminatory among similarly situated creators, or involve parties other than qualifying independent creators and dominant platforms.
Who benefits
Independent musicians, producers, mixers, and sound engineers who own their copyrights and earn under $1 million annually in licensing revenue — a group that likely numbers in the hundreds of thousands. Small independent record labels qualifying under NAICS code 512250. Collective bargaining organizations or guilds that could form to represent these creators. Consumers who supporters argue would benefit from a healthier, more diverse music ecosystem. Attorneys and trade associations that would facilitate collective negotiations.
Who is hurt
Large streaming platforms (e.g., those with over $100 million in annual music distribution revenue) that would face collective negotiating pressure and potential coordinated licensing refusals. Generative AI companies that use music for training data or deployment, who would face similar collective action. Major record labels and their artists, who are excluded from the safe harbor and would not gain the same negotiating leverage. Consumers who opponents argue could see reduced music availability or higher subscription costs if platforms face increased licensing costs. Platforms operating near the $100 million threshold who may face uncertainty about whether they qualify as "dominant."
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that independent music creators face a severe structural power imbalance: dominant platforms can absorb the loss of any single artist's catalog, leaving individual creators with no meaningful negotiating leverage. They contend the Digital Millennium Copyright Act's notice-and-takedown system has been called "largely useless" even by major label trade associations, making it effectively futile for independent creators with fewer resources. Supporters further argue that antitrust law was never intended to protect dominant platforms from collective action by small, atomized creators — and that this bill simply levels the playing field in the same way labor law allows workers to organize.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that antitrust exemptions for collective price-setting — even with guardrails — risk enabling cartel-like behavior that raises costs for platforms and, ultimately, consumers. They contend that existing copyright law and the marketplace already provide remedies, and that a targeted antitrust carve-out sets a troubling precedent that other industries could invoke to justify similar exemptions. Opponents may also argue that the bill's definition of "Dominant Online Music Distribution Platform" is broad enough to capture mid-sized or emerging platforms, potentially chilling competition and new market entrants who cannot absorb coordinated licensing refusals.
Constitutional context
Congress has broad authority to regulate interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause (Art. I, §8, cl. 3), and antitrust law has long been understood as a valid exercise of that power. This bill modifies the application of federal antitrust statutes — a straightforward legislative act within Congress's core Commerce Clause authority. No significant constitutional tension arises from the bill's core mechanism, though the preemption of state antitrust laws in Section 3(a)(1)(B) could raise Tenth Amendment questions about whether Congress is effectively commandeering state regulatory frameworks.
Checks and balances
Congress gains authority by carving out a statutory exemption from existing antitrust law; the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission retain enforcement authority over conduct outside the safe harbor's boundaries, and federal courts would adjudicate disputes over whether specific collective negotiations qualify for the exemption.
Historical precedent
The Curt Flood Act of 1998 similarly created a targeted antitrust exemption for a specific industry (Major League Baseball players' labor relations), and the Newspaper Preservation Act of 1970 granted antitrust immunity to competing newspapers for joint operating agreements.