HR-9069-119
Referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary.
Sponsored by Joe Neguse (D-CO)
What it does
This bill would prohibit the Department of Homeland Security from detaining children, individuals with cognitive disabilities, or their primary caregivers except when a court-issued criminal warrant is in effect. It would also bar DHS from conducting immigration enforcement actions at or within 1,000 feet of "sensitive locations" — a broadly defined category that includes schools, hospitals, houses of worship, courthouses, polling places, shelters, disaster relief sites, and approximately 20 other location types — unless a criminal warrant has been issued. Evidence obtained in violation of these rules would be inadmissible in removal proceedings, and individuals wrongfully detained would be entitled to release and placement in full removal hearings.
Who benefits
Unauthorized immigrant children, individuals with cognitive disabilities, and their primary caregivers who would be shielded from civil immigration detention. Immigrant communities broadly, who may be more willing to access schools, hospitals, shelters, and houses of worship without fear of enforcement. U.S. citizen children of unauthorized immigrant parents, who could avoid family separation. Domestic violence survivors, disaster victims, and others who rely on sensitive-location services. Advocacy organizations and legal service providers who work in or near these locations. State and local child welfare agencies that would receive clearer protocols for custody transfers.
Who is hurt
DHS and ICE, whose civil enforcement capacity would be significantly curtailed in a large number of locations. Federal immigration enforcement personnel who may face operational constraints and legal liability. Jurisdictions or communities that support stricter immigration enforcement. Individuals who argue that limiting enforcement near sensitive locations creates predictable "safe zones" that could be exploited. Taxpayers who may bear costs of additional removal hearings (§240 proceedings) triggered by the bill's remedies provisions. Victims of crimes committed by individuals who might otherwise have been detained under current civil enforcement authority.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that enforcement actions at schools, hospitals, and houses of worship deter vulnerable people — including U.S. citizen children — from accessing essential services, creating documented public health and educational harms. They contend that DHS's own sensitive-location policy has existed administratively since 2011 but lacks legal force, and that codifying it into statute with enforceable remedies closes a gap that the current administration has exploited by rescinding those internal guidelines. They further argue that detaining children and cognitively disabled individuals without a criminal warrant raises serious due process concerns under the Fifth Amendment and Zadvydas v. Davis (2001).
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that the bill's sweeping 1,000-foot buffer zones and expansive list of sensitive locations — covering polling places, union halls, DMV offices, and public demonstrations — would effectively render vast portions of urban areas off-limits to civil immigration enforcement, undermining Congress's plenary power over immigration under Article I. They contend that the criminal-warrant-only exception improperly conflates civil and criminal immigration authority, since most removals proceed through civil proceedings, and that the exclusionary remedy in Section 6 would allow individuals to evade lawful removal by challenging the circumstances of their apprehension rather than their underlying immigration status.
Constitutional context
The Naturalization Clause (Art. I, §8, cl. 4) and the Executive Power/Take Care Clause (Art. II, §3) give Congress and the President broad, shared authority over immigration enforcement. The bill's detention limits engage the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, which under Zadvydas v. Davis (2001) already constrains indefinite civil detention of non-citizens. The criminal-warrant requirement for civil enforcement actions may also raise separation-of-powers questions about Congress's ability to restrict executive enforcement discretion, an area left partially unresolved after United States v. Texas (2023).
Checks and balances
Congress would gain authority by codifying enforcement limits that currently exist only as executive policy, constraining DHS's civil enforcement discretion; the judiciary gains a role through the criminal-warrant requirement and the bill's exclusionary remedy provisions, which route violations into Article III and immigration court review.
Historical precedent
DHS maintained an administrative sensitive-locations policy from 2011 until it was rescinded in early 2025; this bill would be the first time such restrictions were codified into federal statute with enforceable legal remedies.