HR-909-119
Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.
Sponsored by Ann Wagner (R-MO)
What it does
This bill would add a new funding source to the Crime Victims Fund (CVF) by directing certain civil monetary penalties — collected from settlements and judgments in fraud and false claims cases against the federal government — into the CVF through fiscal year 2029. The CVF distributes money to federal, state, and local programs that compensate and assist crime victims. The CVF currently receives deposits from federal criminal fines, forfeited bail bonds, and certain gifts and donations.
Who benefits
Crime victims across the country who receive compensation and services funded by the CVF, including victims of domestic violence, sexual assault, child abuse, and other crimes. State and local victim assistance programs that rely on CVF grants. Victim advocacy organizations and service providers funded through CVF distributions. Federal agencies administering victim compensation programs. Indirectly, communities where victim services are underfunded.
Who is hurt
The federal Treasury, which would receive less revenue from civil monetary penalties that would otherwise flow to the general fund. Corporations and individuals who pay fraud-related civil settlements may face no direct change, but the routing of those penalties away from general appropriations could reduce funds available for other federal programs. If CVF distributions grow, state and local governments may face pressure to match or administer larger grant awards, increasing administrative burdens.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that the CVF has experienced significant funding volatility in recent years — large one-time deposits from major corporate settlements have created boom-and-bust cycles that make it difficult for victim service providers to plan and staff programs reliably. They contend that routing civil fraud penalties into the CVF creates a more consistent and diversified revenue stream, directly linking consequences for defrauding the government to support for crime victims, without requiring new appropriations from Congress.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that civil monetary penalties collected under the False Claims Act and related statutes were designed to deter fraud against the government and compensate taxpayers — not to fund victim services — and that redirecting these funds blurs the purpose of civil enforcement. They contend that the five-year sunset through FY2029 creates only temporary relief without addressing the CVF's structural funding instability, and that a more durable solution would require direct appropriations or a permanent statutory fix rather than a time-limited revenue redirect.
Constitutional context
No significant constitutional issues are raised by this bill. Congress has broad authority under Article I to direct how federal revenues are collected and appropriated. The bill modifies an existing funding mechanism rather than creating new enforcement powers or affecting individual rights.
Checks and balances
Congress gains no new authority — it redirects existing civil penalty revenue; the executive branch continues to collect penalties and administer CVF distributions, with the sunset clause in FY2029 requiring Congress to act again to extend the policy.
Historical precedent
The CVF has previously received large, irregular deposits from major corporate fraud settlements — such as the 2014–2015 period when bank settlements temporarily inflated the fund — which prompted earlier congressional efforts to smooth out funding volatility through spending caps and carry-over rules.