HR-9116-119
Referred to the Committee on Education and Workforce, and in addition to the Committee on the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
Sponsored by Suzanne Bonamici (D-OR)
What it does
This bill would make two changes to federal employment discrimination law. First, it would remove the existing caps on compensatory and punitive damages that apply to discrimination claims based on sex, religion, disability, and genetic information under Title VII and related statutes — allowing courts to award any amount a jury finds appropriate. Second, it would extend the full range of legal and equitable remedies available under Title VII — including compensatory and punitive damages — to age discrimination claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), which currently limits remedies to back pay and liquidated damages.
Who benefits
Workers who win employment discrimination lawsuits based on sex, religion, disability, genetic information, or age — particularly those who suffered large non-economic harms (emotional distress, loss of enjoyment of life) that current caps limit. Older workers (age 40+) covered by the ADEA who currently cannot recover compensatory or punitive damages. Plaintiffs' employment attorneys who could pursue larger recoveries. Workers in large companies, where current caps ($300,000 for employers with 500+ employees) are most constraining relative to the harm suffered.
Who is hurt
Employers — particularly large corporations and small businesses — who would face potentially unlimited compensatory and punitive damages in discrimination suits. Liability insurers who underwrite employment practices liability policies, who may raise premiums across the board. Small businesses, which may face disproportionate litigation risk relative to their resources even though current caps already vary by employer size. Defendants in cases where juries award damages that critics argue are disproportionate to actual harm.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that the current damage caps — set in 1991 and never adjusted — create a two-tiered justice system where race discrimination victims (who face no statutory cap under 42 U.S.C. §1981) can recover full damages while sex, religion, disability, and age discrimination victims cannot, regardless of how severe the harm. They contend that capping damages at $300,000 for the largest employers fails to deter well-resourced companies from discriminatory conduct and leaves seriously harmed workers without full compensation for documented losses like emotional suffering and career destruction.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that removing damage caps would expose employers — especially small businesses — to unpredictable, potentially runaway jury awards that bear no relationship to actual economic harm, driving up litigation costs and employment practices insurance premiums for all employers. They contend that the existing cap structure, which already scales with employer size (from $50,000 for small employers to $300,000 for the largest), reflects a deliberate congressional balance between deterrence and economic predictability, and that uncapped punitive damages could chill legitimate employment decisions out of fear of catastrophic liability.
Constitutional context
Congress's authority to expand remedies for employment discrimination rests on the Commerce Clause (Art. I, §8, cl. 3), upheld for public accommodations in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States (1964) and broadly applied to employment. The Equal Protection Clause (14th Amend., §1) is relevant to the bill's premise that different protected classes receiving different remedies may be constitutionally unequal, though remedy disparities created by statute are generally subject only to rational basis review.
Checks and balances
Congress would expand judicial remedial authority; federal courts would set actual damage awards subject to constitutional due process limits on punitive damages (BMW of North America v. Gore); employers retain the right to challenge excessive awards on appeal.
Historical precedent
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 originally established the current damage caps and extended compensatory and punitive damages to Title VII claims; prior to that act, only equitable relief (back pay, reinstatement) was available for most employment discrimination claims.